





ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN DEATHS AT THE HOSPITAL FOR SICK CHILDREN AND RELATED MATTERS.

Hearing held 8th floor 180 Dundas Street West Toronto, Ontario

The Honourable Mr. Justice S.G.M. Grange

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Commissioner

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Transcript of evidence for

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4	Hearing held on the 8th Floor, 180 Dundas Street West, Toronto,			
5	Ontario, on Wednesday, the 25th day of January, 1984.			
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7	Tr. 5 Mrs. Global, Mrs. 1 Mrs.			
8	THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.G.M. GRANGE - Commissioner			
9	THOMAS MILLAR - Administrator			
10	MURRAY R. ELLIOT - Registrar			
11	APPEARANCES:			
**	APPEARANCES:			
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(Cont'd) ...



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11		child Stephanie Lombardo); and Heather Dawson (mother of deceased child Amber Dawson)
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<u>VOLUME 90</u> - 23 January 1984

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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)



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MT/ak

--- Upon commencing at 10:00 a.m.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Roland, are

you on?

MR. ROLAND: Yes, Mr. Commissioner.

MR. LAMEK: Mr. Commissioner, I wonder if I might say something before Mr. Roland begins, please, and it goes to the scheduling of witnesses.

As you know I had proposed that immediately following the evidence going to the report which we are now hearing, I thought that I would call those persons most directly affected by the report, and that had been our thought from the beginning.

I have spoken to Mr. Strathy and to Mr. Sopinka, and it is their preference I think that their clients, at a rather later stage of the proceedings, and with that I am perfectly happy to agree.

Therefore what I am proposing, sir, is that when this evidence is finished which it appears now may be some time this week, I propose next week to call certain nurses who were not on the Trayner team. That is to say next week Nurse Costello and perhaps Nurse Bell. To follow them with people



of Part I?

of other evidence.

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like Mrs. Radojewski and Lynn Johnston and perhaps other nurses, and then to move on to the members of the Trayner team starting with Brownless, working through Christie, Scott, Nelles and Trayner, and that therefore is the revised proposed sequence of the evidence that I think will follow this.

THE COMMISSIONER: Is that the end

MR. LAMEK: That will be the end of the evidence that I propose to adduce on Part I.

THE COMMISSIONER: You haven't heard any rumours, or have you from anyone else?

MR. LAMEK: I haven't yet, but perhaps we could at some appropriate time, perhaps towards the end of the week, raise the question

THE COMMISSIONER: If you feel you can indicate at any time what evidence you do intend to call. I take it you have not been asked by anyone to call any evidence other than what --

MR. LAMEK: Yes, I have had one request from counsel. I have discussed it with him and it is still in a state of uncertainty.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. All right.

Thank you.



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Well, we don't need to get too worked up about it for a while.

Yes, Mr. Roland?

DR. LESBIA F. SMITH, Resumed DR. JAMES WALTER BUEHLER, Resumed DR. EVELYN MacKENZIE WALLACE, Resumed MR. ROBERT KUSIAK, Resumed

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. ROLAND:

Let me start with for the Q. moment your methodology so that I understand it. I gather from your report that this is - yes, I am Ian Roland and I act for the Hospital - I gather from reviewing the report that is what would be termed a contract research project rather than what is understood as a funded research where one is competing for funds in doing certain kinds of research, epidemiological research. That is there wasn't with respect to your methodology any peer review of the methodology before the studies took place; the kind of peer review that would occur in a funded research where you are competing for funds.

Is that fair to say?

(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

It is fair to say this was Α. not a funded research endeavour.

> 0. Yes.



(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

at that time that it was developed.

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0.

these specific hypotheses.

And it was not peer reviewed

So that I gather there was

And in looking at the report

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no outside input into the methodology as you developed it. The methodology was entirely done

by your group?

A. That is correct, yes.

I see that there were no hypotheses established at the outset. Rather it appears at least from my review of the report that what you did is you collected data through various studies, and then having done that you describe the data that you had collected in a descriptive fashion rather than starting with a specific hypothesis and conducting

a study in a way to either establish or refute

A. There are various types of epidemiologic studies. One of the ways of approaching a situation is to do what is called a descriptive study.

Q. Yes.

A. That is you describe what happened, and from that derive some numbers that



(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

you can then proceed to analyze.

Q. Yes.

A. There are also analytic studies which are designed studies that help you test a certain hypothesis.

Q. Yes.


A. So this particular report covers both descriptive epidemiological techniques as well as analytic techniques.

Q. Yes.

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

A. I believe in testimony given yesterday we went through each section of the report and addressed the questions that we were asking at each section of the report.

Q. All right. Let's turn then to some of the sections and in particular let's start with Study No. 4 which is the ward population study, and as I understand it you were dealing there with a sample of 807 admissions and you told us that you had originally 16 categories and 50 of those 807 admissions were given to Dr. Rowe and Dr. Freedom to review (that is the information concerning those, the specific information that you provided with



Smith, Buehler, Wallace, Kusiak, cr.ex. (Roland)

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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

respect to each admission), and that there was no good agreement between them in their categorization of those 50 samples from the 807 admissions.

That is not precisely correct. Α. The 50 that they looked at in attempting - during the process of putting this study together was not selected from that 807.

I see. It was selected from the overall 2400, was it?

> A . Partly, yes.

0. I see. But apart from that I am right, am I, there was no good agreement on the 50, and then what you did I gather is you condensed the scale, I guess on Dr. Rowe's suggestion or with his assistance to three rather than 16 and the proceeded to let him do the categorization of the 807?

Α. There were three categories for severity and three categories for prognosis.

> Q. Yes.

(Dr. Smith) May I add? Each of these was subdivided into whether it was a medical or surgical admission.

> Yes. Q.



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the reliability of the process of the study you reduced the reliability of it? Isn't that a fair statement? In other words, reducing from 16 to 3,

(Dr. Buehler) For prognosis.

(Dr. Smith) For prognosis.

Isn't it fair to say usually

(ANSWERS BY MR. KUSIAK)

Α.

Α.

Q.

I'm sorry, I don't quite understand what you mean by the word "reliability". Q. Well, when you have 16 cate-

when you condense a scale rather than increasing

if anything, would reduce the reliability of it?

gories you can become - everything else being equal you can provide a much more specific and reliable categorization than you can from three broader categories; isn't that so?


A. Well, by "reliable" you mean a more precise estimate?

> 0. Yes.

Rather than reliable in the Α. sense there is no misclassification of cases?

> Q. Exactly.

Α. Yes. I think the finer the scale, given that the categories remain accurate or the cases are put in their right category you



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get a more precise answer.

- Yes. And when you have --Q.
- (Dr. Buehler) Let me add to Mr. Kusiak's answer, please.

In addition to that I think as you look at the methodology it is extremely important to keep in mind the types of information that are available to us, and the type of information that we had for this part of the study was microfilm discharge records that included certain patient identification which we removed, patient's age, a list of discharge diagnoses and a list of procedures performed.

We worked with Dr. Rowe in putting those cateogries together, and Dr. Rowe felt that given the type of information that was available to him that the three categories he used were the most appropriate and best categories for that phase of the study.

Let me just read to you what Q. Dr. Rowe has testified to (and it is very brief) in these proceedings about the categorization that you asked him to do. And in particular with his view of the kind of information that he was provided with.



Smith, Buehler, Wallace, Kusiak, cr.ex. (Roland)

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This is in Volume 21 at page 3809 he says - he was asked the question:

"Q. Were you comfortable performing that exercise..."

(the exercise we are talking about)


"...with that kind of information?"

His answer:

"No.

- Q. Why not?
- A. Well, not really comfortable.

 I was obliging the people who were investigating because I felt they had decided this was something they needed; that we should do it. But we were not invited into the planning of that manoeuvre.
- Q. Why were you uncomfortable doing it?
- A. Because of the limited information that you would have available to make a decision of that sort.
- Q. I take it what you would get would be four lines that would represent a file or a record in your



Smith, Buehler, Wallace, Kusiak, cr.ex. (Roland)

"hospital that might be an inch thick?

A. Or more."

So it appears that Dr. Rowe, at least from the information that you provided to him (he was obliging you as he says), he didn't feel comfortable but it was sufficient information to do an accurate or a valid review of the 807 cases.

Now what do you have to say about that and what about the information that he was provided?





Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kusiak cr.ex. (Roland)

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(ANSWERS BY DR. WALLACE)

A. Dr. Rowe did not express his sentiments to us. He said he would be happy to look at the information and do what he could with it. Where he found himself unable to make a judgment he the indicated this on/ slips of paper that were provided to him and these were withdrawn from the analysis.

I would also like perhaps to go into the background of why we adopted this particular methodology with which you are taking issue. Could I refer you to the last sentence on page 5. It begins:

"Similarly, it was not possible to divide the patient-day denominator into different age groups in order to calculate age-specific mortality rates."

Now, that is a very important sentence in this report. Having established that there was indeed an epidemic, that the mortality rates had increased, we were most anxious to establish whether these rates had increased for all age groups or only for specific age groups. Had we been given this information from the Hospital, which they did try to



(ANSWERS BY DR. WALLACE)

Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kusiak cr.ex. (Roland)

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give us but were unable to do so, we would not then have proceeded to do the study which we call Dr. Rowe's study.

Q. You would have done an agespecific study as I understand it?

A. Exactly, and we would have been able to say immediately whether the increase in the death rate was simply limited to younger children or was true for all children.

A. (Dr. Buehler) Similarly, to add to what Dr. Wallace said, it was not possible to subdivide the patient-day denominator that we used in calculating mortality rates, using an indicator of severity of illness. These are issues that we explored in depth to the best that we could with members of the Hospital staff and the data were not available to subdivide patient days either by age or severity.

A. So the study as designed was less than ideal, but given the circumstances we found ourselves in and the data sources that were available to us, this was the only way we felt we could reasonably try to answer the question.

A. (Dr. Buehler) In addition, in



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(ANSWERS BY DR. WALLACE)

TORONTO, ONTARIO

talking to Dr. Rowe about this part of the study, we were very well aware that the information he was being provided was certainly less than say the information that Dr. Nadas was provided, . . as you quite dramatically illustrated. I think we in presenting the method state exactly what it was that he had available.

You see what concerns me is that you have this assessment that there was no good agreement between Dr. Rowe and Dr. Freedom in the 50 or so cases that each of them did. What concerns me is that the reason for that may not be the categories which you condensed from 16 to 3, it may be the paucity of information that each were provided with, or the kind of information that each were provided. It may be that their lack of good agreement was found not in the categories but in the information that each was assessing.

In that case it makes sense to have only one person do the rating because he would base his judgments on his own criteria.

Yes but that might not be -they may be the criteria may not be /very subjective to that individual if the information leads to a more



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
(ANSWERS BY DR. WALLACE)

subjective rather than a more objective assessment, objective in the sense that several cardiologists would agree with him.

A. We would have to agree that, yes, there was a great deal of subjective decision making here, the study is less than ideal.

A. (Dr. Buehler) And to add to that the advantage of having one observer make those observations given the potential for variations of non-observers was that one observer would be consistent with himself.

- Q. But nevertheless I take it you didn't do any internal check to see if he was internally consistent with his own?
 - A. That is correct.
 - O. You didn't do that?
 - A. We didn't do that.
- Q. You didn't do an external check to see if he was consistent with some other cardiologist?
 - A. We did not, no.
- Q. And indeed as I understand it, at least from your report, you didn't do a comparison between the results achieved by Dr. Rowe



B5

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

even in examining those babies' deaths that he examined during the epidemic period, or I think there was one death that he examined outside the epidemic period, with the results achieved by Dr. Nadas for prognosis and severity?

A. We addressed that issue yesterday and I think we emphasized that the types of scores that Dr. Rowe and Dr. Nadas performed were very different.

Q. Except that they were both doing essentially the same exercise when it came to dealing with the deaths because Dr. Rowe did deal with I think 16 or 17 deaths that fell into the sample, and they were doing the same exercise basically of trying to score severity and prognosis. I am just wondering did you do any comparison of those with the results achieved by Dr. Nadas to see if there was any kind of accordance or agreement?

A. We did no formal comparison of those.

Q. Can you tell us or recall your informal comparison, when you say formal I take it there was some comparison?

Α.

We -- well let





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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

me tell the reason we didn't do a formal comparison, and that was that the ratings that Dr. Rowe did were based on a sample of patients who began hospitalization on the cardiology ward, and therefore would not include all of the patients. The realm of patients who were at risk of death included patients who began hospitalization not only on the cardiology ward but also in other Hospital areas. So that there was some limitation to the population base from which Dr. Rowe's study was taken.

In addition we made no mathematical combination of any of Dr. Rowe's or Dr. Nadas' assessments. In other words, we didn't attempt to calculate rates using one assessment in the enumerator and another in the denominator in this report. We were interested in looking at that in a very, very informal way, and I would qualify it as simply that, the overview that we made, but I cannot tell you how precise that was.

Q. Let's move on to Dr. Nadas

for a moment. Maybe this came up yesterday, but just
to deal with it shortly. I take it there was no
age adjustment factor examined in Dr. Nadas'
assessment, that is you didn't adjust his review for



B7

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

age. I put it that way because there may be implicit a greater degree of -- a greater chance of death with the same prognosis and severity for younger rather than older babies. We have heard that younger babies are more fragile. I wonder if there is anything in Dr. Nadas' study, any adjustment for age in that context.

A. Let me back up and say what Dr. Nadas' assessments were. Dr. Nadas' assessments were clinical assessments based on his view of the patient's chart, which included potentially all of the information that was in the chart, but obviously he must have focused his attention on certain parts of the chart, but we cannot speak to the specific reviews that he did since he is not here to testify.

Dr. Nadas as a clinician would take important factors into consideration and would most likely take age into consideration in making his assessments of patient severity, but 'I emphasize that we cannot speak for Dr. Nadas.

Q. So if there was any adjustment it was done by Dr. Nadas himself initially when he did his assessment?

THE COMMISSIONER: That is not



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

an adjustment is it? What he is doing, he is looking at the chart to make the answer, and it wouldn't be a question of adjustment.



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THE COMMISSIONER: If I find a child who is age five days and has a certain disease, I might consider that more serious than a child that was five years with that disease, I don't know.

MR. ROLAND: Well, that is what I mean. By taking age into account you may have the same illness and the same clinical characteristics with respect to two children, but if one is substantially younger than the other it may be more severe with the younger rather than with the older.

DR. BUEHLER: Let me back up for a moment and address the issue of why Dr. Nadas was selected. I don't know if that is something that has come up prior to our testimony.

As has been presented, one of the
early considerations that we had in making our assessments was the need for outside consultants, particularly
the need for a cardiologist. As we are not here to -certainly I am not qualified to assess Dr. Nadas'
competence in making a clinical assessment. However,
when the hospital recommended consultants to us Dr.
Nadas was very, very strongly recommended and
repeatedly so by the hospital staff, in particular
by Dr. Carver. We were repeatedly told by Dr. Carver that
Dr. Nadas is a pre-eminent pediatric cardiologist



and I think it was fair for us to assume that Dr.

Nadas is fully competent to make an informed

clinical impression of the severity of the illness
in a patient with heart disease.

MR. ROLAND: Q. I don't doubt that for a moment. I am not in any disagreement with you on that, I just wanted to know what the adjustment exercise, if any, went on with respect to age in his study and you have told me that.

A. Okay. You have to separate the process of making the assessment from the process of analyzing the data.

Q. Yes.

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

- A. Is that the question?
- Q. Well, first of all, during the assessment you have told us I gather that he did adjust or you presume that he took age into consideration when he was doing his assessment. Did you do any adjustment in the analysis?
- A. Okay, that is a separate question, then.
 - Q. Yes.
- A. In the analysis that we did of the comparisons between deaths during the epidemic



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

period and deaths not during the epidemic period we did not perform a multivariate analysis; in other words, the process of taking into account more than one variable at a time. If you are interested I could refer to my notes because some of that data is broken down by age.

Q. Yes. Well, for instance, what I am wondering is, did you do any kind of ranking, numerical ranking of the deaths by age, for instance, which would give us some sense of how the epidemic period compared to the non-epidemic period. The way in which, for instance, sports fan compare how one hockey team is doing to another by looking at the scoring statistics for each player on the team to see if there are - this wouldn't be the case this year, - a good number of Maple Leafs in the top ten in the scoring rates, that kind of numerical listing, scoring of hockey players. wonder if you did that kind of numerical listing in the deaths by age for the babies.

- A. (DR. BUEHLER) Mr. Kusiak?
- A. (MR. KUSIAK) Did we do that?
- Q. Which is a way, I gather, of giving some sort of qualitative analysis to the



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

comparision between age and death or age and severity of those babies who died.

A. I believe we have already said in the analysis we have looked at the entire group of the epidemic period deaths compared to the group of non-epidemic period deaths in that manner alone.

- Q. Yes.
- A. I think that is a point that Dr. Haynes addressed in his report.
 - Q. Yes.
- A. And if you are interested we could get into that in more detail.
- Q. All right. That is not in your report, I take it, but you have done that kind of work, looking at ranking them in that way.
- A. Are you asking about the performance of a specific type of statistical test? It may be easier for us to answer your question if you have the name of a specific test in mind.
- Q. Well, for instance, I am thinking of the numerical ranking, did you do that kind of thing; for instance, ranking them from the



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)
youngest to the oldest?

A. No. I believe we have already said that we looked at the group of epidemic deaths.

Q. Yes.

A. In comparison to the non-epidemic deaths as a whole.

Q. In the study 5 in doing the comparison of deaths you have told us that you checked the abstracting process carried out by the three members of your team and the fourth person and you did that by determining a level of concordance.

What was the level of concordance that you were able to establish or find.

A. (DR. SMITH) It was over 90%.

In crucial areas where the primary abstractor and the reviewing abstractor disagreed, those disagreements were discussed, reasons for them were explained and, for example, if one abstractor found something quite hidden in the chart that a reviewer had not found that fully justified that particular answer that they put on the abstraction sheet then that would be the final word.

A. (DR. BUEHLER) For specific areas of the abstracting form.



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(ANSWERS	BY	DR.	BUEHLER:)
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- Q. But overall it was 90%?
- A. For the entire abstraction

form?

- Q. Yes.
- A. Not for the entire abstraction

form.

- Q. I see, just for the key areas?
- A. (DR. SMITH) For the key areas,

right.

- Q. Now, let's turn to the association of death with hospital personnel, which is your section 8. As I understand it, Nurse Shielton, who was a team leader, was used to compile the data from various sources and one of the sources was known as the Ward Information Statistics or WIN sheets; is that correct?
- A. (DR. BUEHLER) I'm not familiar with that acronym.
- Q. Well, let me show you the sample of this. I gather that Nurse Shielton had a number of data sources in which she compiled the data. I wonder if this is one of the sources that she had available to her. This is an example of the WIN sheet that is kept by the hospital.



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

A. There is one important exception, however, or distinction to make in that these are xeroxes and NurseShielton used originals and told us that in some cases the originals had handwritten materials on the back. So, these are not representative of the information that she used.

Q. All right. Well, did she have the WIN sheets or these sheets available to her in her work? This is for 1980, for instance, and it was something kept by all of the wards. The example I have handed up is a Ward 4A example and it shows the shifts for the nurses that were on duty in those days.

A. I cannot recall the exact appearances of the sheets that she used and therefore I am unable to verify whether or not these are the sheets she used.

Q. I see. The reason I asked this is because there was I gather yesterday some question about whether or not you had data available to you about nurses being transferred in and out of the ward during a shift. As I understand it, and correct me if I'm wrong, as I understand it you indicated you didn't think that data was available as part of your data base and these WIN sheets show these



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

nurses being transferred during a shift to other wards and from Ward 4A. They don't show nurses being transferred into 4A but they show nurses being transferred out of 4A during a shift and the hours they spent in some other ward. I wondered if this was data that was available to you or used by Nurse Shielton in providing the information she did to you.

A. I am not clear that I understand your assumption of our response to the question yesterday because I think it may not be exactly correct. My understanding is that the information that Nurse Shielton and it showed that there were times when someone came on the shift at the middle of the shift and sometimes there was a person who started the shift and then left in the middle of the shift. Clearly, if you look at the nursing calendar that she constructed you see evidence of that, of someone coming on mid-shift or some time after the 12 hour change.

Q. I see. We may be under some misunderstanding and unfortunately I wasn't here yesterday but I thought that you had indicated I think when you were cross-examined by Ms. Symes that there seemed to be a gap in the data to the



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

extent that you weren't able to indicate or didn't indicate if a nurse came on, for instance, Ward 4A during a shift or left during the shift.



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

A. Ms. Symes asked us, I believe, whether we could be certain that such changes were documented. We can't be certain that those changes were documented 100 per cent.

Q. You could only be certain if you documented them yourself I take it?

A. Pardon?

Q. I gather you could only be certain if you were there and documenting it yourself?

A. Documenting the comings --

Q. Documenting the comings and

A. Yes.

Q. Apart from that it is difficult to be certain about these things?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. You told us with respect to the work done by Nurse Shilton that you did some spot checking. You didn't check it all but you did spot check. Did you find any errors in your spot checks?

(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

goings, yes.

A. Miss Shilton's translations into our original calendar were immaculate. She was



stage.

Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kusiak cr.ex. (Roland)

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(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

a fastidious, meticulous worker, and we did not find any errors. We did subsequently find other transcription errors into our entries.

- Q. I am talking about the first
 - A. At the first stage we did not.
- Q. You have in your study given us the association of deaths with Hospital personnel during the epidemic period.

Did you attempt to measure the association of Hospital personnel and particular nurses, because that is what is focused on in your study, the association of nurses and deaths in other periods, in non-epidemic periods, to see if you could come up with the same kind of results?

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

- A. This study that we performed --
- Q. Yes.
- A. -- with the nursing calendar was limited to that nine-month epidemic period.
- Q. Yes. Did you do any other studies that tried to compare that, a similar study to compare it to non-epidemic periods?
 - A. We did not do a similar study



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

for non-epidemic periods.

Q. All right. Let me take you now to your Table 11 so that I understand it and deal with the confidence limits. First with

Nurse 401, as I see it, the confidence limits (this is on page 44; these are for Category A deaths) is

23 to infinity.

As I understand it then that means that in 95 - there is a 95% confidence that a death will occur relative to other nurses 23 times to infinity while Nurse Trayner or Nurse 401 is on duty.

(ANSWERS BY MR. KUSIAK)

A. Would you repeat that relative to...?

Q. Relative to the other nurses, to the other staff.

A. The relative risk is the rate of dying while Nurse 401 is on duty as compared to when she is not on duty.

Q. When she is not on duty, all right. So there is 23% chance to infinity that it will occur while she is on duty rather than when she is not on duty?



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(ANSWERS BY MR. KUSIAK)

A. No. It means that the rate of dying while she is on duty is 23 times the rate of dying while she is off duty.

Q. And that is the lower limit, and it is infinity at the higher limit?

A. That is true.

Q. And if we compare that to Nurse 402, Nurse Nelles, her range for the total is 4.2 to 14.3, and I note that there is no overlap there between Nurse 401 and Nurse 402?

A. That is true.

Q. And I gather that means, and correct me if I am wrong, that Nurse 401 is statistically significantly different than any other nurse; that is Nurse 402 or any other, because there is no overlap between her and the other nurses? So that makes her significantly different in a statistical sense?

A. Well, I think again -- that would be suggestive of a statistically significant difference.

Q. Yes.

A. I think one would have to do a slightly different analysis to actually show



Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kusiak cr.ex. (Roland)

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(ANSWERS BY MR. KUSIAK) that in a reverse way.

What sort of analysis would Q. you do?

Α. I would do a sort of a 2 by 2 table analysis looking at when both nurses were on duty and when deaths occurred when both nurses were on duty as compared to when deaths occurred when only one of the nurses was on duty, and then classify their work schedules similarly --

> Q. Yes.

-- and attempt to analyze, compare the relative risks of dying that way.

Q. And that would establish whether there is, in your mind I take it, whether there was a significant statistical difference between Nurse 401 and Nurse 402?

- Or any other nurse. A.
- Q. You say in your mind this

doesn't do it?

- A. It is suggestive.
- Have you done -- you haven't 0. done that study?

A . No.

Is it something you can do or 0.



(ANSWERS BY MR. KUSIAK)

not? Do you have the information to do it?

A. Well, given that this data is accepted as accurate, one can do it.

Q. Yes. Now let me turn for a moment to the report done by Dr. Haynes and Dr.

Taylor on your report, and I take it you have now had an opportunity to read it and digest it?

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

A. We have read Dr. Haynes' report. We have not performed the recalculation that he suggests.

Q. Yes, but apart from that I take it you have digested the report?

A. We have read it. It fook Dr. Haynes a long time to review our report, and we certainly haven't had a comparable amount of time to review his.

Q. Let me just ask you about the summary that he does at page i at the beginning of the report and simply ask you if you agree or disagree with the conclusions he arrives at on that, beginning on that page, and let's start with No. 1 which deals with the association of Hospital personnel and deaths.



Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kusiak cr.ex. (Roland)

D7

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

He says:

"This association was statistically significantly stronger than for any other person studied and numerically much stronger than any other association discovered in any of the other studies described in the Report."

I take it you would agree with that?

A. Let me just take a moment to read that paragraph in detail.

- Q. All right.
- A. Do you mind if I read it

out loud.

- Q. No, not at all.
- A. "If the data on nursing work schedules (Study VIII Association of death with Hospital personnel) are accepted as valid, then the deaths during the July 1980-March 1981 period were exceptionally strongly associated with the working periods of one specific nurse. This association was statistically significantly stronger than for any other



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

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person studied and numerically
much stronger than any other association discovered in any of the other
studies described in the Report."

Now --

Q. Stopping there.

A. Yes. I believe the question that you just asked of Mr. Kusiak dealt with the first part of that second sentence.

Q. Yes.

A. "This association was statistically significantly stronger than for any other person studied..."

And I believe Mr. Kusiak just addressed that issue.

Q. Yes.

A. Dr. Haynes has used the word "exceptionally", and that is a word that we did not use.

Q. All right. What about the latter part of it, "and numerically much stronger than any other association discovered in any of the other studies described in the Report"?

Do you agree or disagree with that?

A. I do not know exactly what



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

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if any remanalysis of our data Dr. Haynes performed.

If he did perform any other analysis it suggests that he calculated odds ratios or relative risk estimates for, say, the case control study.

As our Report appears we did not make those types of calculations, and to answer that precisely we would need to go back and do the analysis slightly differently to answer that issue.

Certainly I do not believe that -well as far as Nurse 401 is concerned... Let me
stop there.

- Q. Let's go to the next one.
- A. Yes.
- Q. No. 2. He introduces the next four numbered paragraphs with the paragraph:

"All of the comments that follow are based on associations of much less strength than that above. They should therefore be given proportionately less weight in attempting to understand the reasons for the increase in mortality during the July 1980-March 1981 period."

Do you agree with that, first of all?



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

A. I will trust Dr. Haynes' ability in assuming that he is correct in analyzing the information that we present in our Report.


You see my problem is I cannot tell you with certainty about the associations being "of much less strength than that above".

O. Yes.

A. It depends on whether you look at Category A, B, C or all deaths, and since we did not calculate odds ratios and relative risk estimates -- excuse me, since we did not calculate odds ratios as an estimate of relative risk in the case control study I cannot answer that question precisely. Certainly there was a very strong association observed between a particular nurse and certain deaths.

Q. All right. Going on to No. 2 it says:

"There was increased utilization of the ICU during the July 1980-March 1981 period which may have placed an increased burden of severely ill patients on the wards. Whether this actually affected the wards, and if



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

so, whether the infant room on Ward 4A was affected are not established in the Report."

Do you agree or disagree with that?

A. There was increased utilization of the ICU during that period. "Established",

I would say that is a word with some certainty.

Q. Yes.

A. And I would agree that we could not say with certainty that we established whether this actually affected the wards, and if so, whether the infant room on Ward 4A was affected. Yes, I would agree with that sentence.

Q. All right. Let's go to 3.

Would you agree with that?

A. "There were increased numbers of infant beds on the wards, particularly 4A, during the increase in mortality..."

To be precise the increase in number of beds occurred three months before the increase in mortality.

Q. Yes.

A. "...in comparison with the

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preceding period ... "

Q. Okay. You have made that

point.

A. "...but not the following period (when other adjustments may have occurred in the care of patients as a result of the investigations into the mortality increase)."

Yes, I would agree with that.

Q. Not far to go; two more.

A. No. 4.

"There was clustering of deaths: a. on Ward 4A..."

Yes, we observed that. Let me just refer to that section of the Report. On page 14 and page 15, at the bottom of page 14 we begin with the sentence, the second sentence in that paragraph that begins at the bottom of page 14:

"For pre-epidemic deaths, the location at the reference time was Ward 4A..."

Q. 5A.

A. I'm sorry.

"...Ward 5A for eight of the eleven



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

(72.7%), Ward 4A for two (18.2%), and Ward 4B for one (9.1%). For epidemic period deaths, the location was Ward 4A for 29 of 36 (80.6%) and Ward 4B for seven (19.4%)."

Then we give that information for Ward 4B and say -we make a comparison between the pre-epidemic -we make a comparison between non-epidemic and
epidemic patients only for those non-epidemic
patients who were not on Ward 5A, and we assign a
probability of p = 0.04, Ward 4A versus 4B for
epidemic versus post-epidemic deaths.



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E/DM/ak

page 15:

THE COMMISSIONER: May I interpret just for a moment.

DR. BUEHLER: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Isn't what Dr. Haynes is saying here, is he is saying that of those deaths that took place on the ward there was a cluster of them, there was an emphasis on Ward 4A first of all.

DR. BUEHLER: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: And then after that in the infant room of 4A, and that is - I think that is what Mr. Roland is asking you to agree with, to agree with that.

DR. BUEHLER: Yes, during the epidemic period there were more deaths on Ward 4A.

THE COMMISSIONER: And also more in the infant room of Ward 4A as well.

DR. BUEHLER: The information on the room at the time of death was less complete than information on ward at time of death and that difference although suggestive was not statistically significant.

THE COMMISSIONER: If you look at

"Of patients with a known room number,



E2

"the location was in Room 418 (the 4A infant room adjacent to the nursing station) for 22 of 27..."

It seemed to me that you, Doctor, are saying the same thing, but perhaps I am wrong.

DR. BUEHLER: Yes, we are making a comparison 22 of 27. Here we are comparing, well, let me take a moment to --

DR. WALLACE: Can I ask the point Mr. Roland was making, I am sorry I have forgotten.

DR. BUEHLER: It may not be necessary to go into this in great detail. I think Dr. Haynes states it with somewhat more certainty than how we stated it, and again I don't know if Dr. Haynes and Dr. Taylor did any further analysis of our data, they certainly had the data available to do that if they wanted to.

MR. ROLAND: Q. Let's deal with, he says there was clustering of the deaths and we are talking about the epidemic period of course, you have already dealt with 4A and you have dealt with the infant room of 4A. Although I think in reviewing your report at page 15 it appears, at least to me, that there is a clustering with respect to both the infant room and the ward?



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

A. That is correct. He used the word clustering, I may be trying to read Dr. Haynes too carefully, he does not in that summary attach any statistical test to that. So, yes, looking at that there is clustering.

- Q. And with respect to the hours as well, that has some statistical significance?
 - A. Yes, that is correct.
- Q. And among the patients with intravenous lines.
- A. Now, I don't think we can say among those patients who died with intravenous lines was there clustering on Ward 4A or for a particular room.

THE COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry, what was that, you say you can't say there was a clustering of patients with intravenous lines? (I thought all of the patients except one, certainly of the Class A and Class B had intravenous lines, isn't that right.

DR. BUEHLER: Yes. The point we made in the report was that the children who died during the epidemic period were more likely to have intravenous lines. The way I read this is that



there was a clustering among patients who had intravenous lines which is a slightly different way of saying that.

MR. ROLAND: Q. You don't know whether the ones who didn't die - have you any figures on those, the ones who did not die had no intravenous lines?

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

A. Only for the death room rate comparisons.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, and I have forgotten, what were they, what were those?

DR. BUEHLER: Let me check that.

MR. ROLAND: Q. If you turn to page 15 where you deal with the IV line under the heading "Other Therapeutic Measures" it seems to be statistically significant where you find that:

"31 of 36 epidemic-period deaths versus
9 of 20 non-epidemic deaths had an
IV line at the reference time (p=0.003)."

A. That is correct, I am just not certain that is exactly what is said by the way that sentence is phrased. But clearly as you pointed out patients who died during the epidemic period when compared to patients who did not die during the



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

epidemic period were more likely to have an intravenous line.

Q. Having dealt with the facts let's go to the conclusions of Dr. Haynes and Dr. Taylor draw, and they say:

"These features narrow down the possible causes considerably."

And do you agree with that, that is you were able to exclude a good many causes, it narrows, these factors narrow these things down considerably.

They go on to say:

"Specifically, the increased mortality appears to have been mainly due to events in the care of infants with intravenous lines in the infant room of Ward 4A during the July 1980 - March 1981 period."

A. I believe that is slightly stronger language than we used in our report, particularly with respect to the phrase "in the infant room". But in a general sense I would agree with that statement.

Q. Finally we deal with the mortality surveillance study, and he concludes:



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with that?

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
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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

"The mortality surveillance study described at the end of the Report does not appear to us to be adequate to prevent recurrence of the problem." That is the problem that we see in this report of yours. Do you agree or disagree

- We did not provide a methodology for the Hospital to conduct surveillance.
- That is right, there is no model that you provided us with.
- Α. We - I think what we did do however was to approach how you might begin to look at that type of problem if surveillance detected an increase, but we did not provide a methodology for surveillance.
- And you didn't test any particular model I take it?
- (Dr. Wallace) I don't recall that we were asked to do that.
- Whether you were asked or not, Q. I just asked you did you do it, you didn't test any particular model?
 - (Dr. Wallace) No, we did not.



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

A. Well, let me qualify that, however. For example, earlier in the testimony we mentioned that within two or three days, or shortly after arriving at the Hospital, in fact the first weekend that we were there, we were able to take information that the Hospital routinely collects and using that generate a figure that resembled Figure 3 in our report. So to that, and I believe in our recommendations, we mentioned that there is information the Hospital is already routinely collecting that could be used as part of a surveillance program.

- Q. But you haven't I gather developed a model or tested a model to see whether it would be useful or not in certain circumstances?
- A. We have not developed a surveillance program for the Hospital.
- Q. Indeed I gather, and correct me if I am wrong, that there are very few of any hospitals that have a mortality surveillance model that they use?
- A. I do not have any precise information on this on which to base an answer to that question. I think it extremely important to



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

realize that in the recommendation section of our report we were in no way intending to imply or suggest that the Hospital was not doing something it should. We were offering a recommendation that I think would be useful to hospitals in general in the future.

- Q. Let me turn to page "vi" of the summary of Drs. Haynes and Taylor and they talk about loose ends in the data. I just want to ask you whether or not you in fact tried to deal with any of these loose ends that he refers to, and if so what results you achieve?
 - A. Let me just read this paragraph:

 "Although the conclusions outlined
 above are of considerable strength
 from an epidemiologic perspective,
 there are some "loose ends' in the
 data concerning who was directly
 responsible for and actually delivering the care of the patients who
 died,..."
- Q. Stopping you there, did you do any kind of study to measure that in any statistical sense?



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

A. We did - let me look for a moment at the data sheets we used in the preparation of the Atlanta Report. For example we did look at which nurse signed off on the medication sheets for medication doses. In the comparison epidemic to non-epidemic deaths, or in looking at the epidemic deaths themselves, there was no pattern that clearly emerged from that.

To continue with the sentence:

"...whether more severely ill patients

were specifically assigned to the

staff most closely associated with

the deaths,..."

We did not address that issue:

"...and whether the deaths were associated with the working schedules of staff other than those considered."

Q. I think you have answered that in your presentation about other staff.

A. Thank you.

Q. Okay. Finally, on having read Dr. Haynes' and Dr. Taylor's full report is there anything in it, and let us set aside their re-analysis because we don't know the accuracy of



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

the figures we are dealing with there. Is there anything you take particular exception to?

- A. I would be reluctant to go on record making those types of judgment at this time.

 I think in fairness to us that is a valid request.
- Q. Well, if you do have any particular exceptions that you develop when you have more time to review it perhaps you could let us know.
 - A. I would be happy to do that.
- Q. We have been asked this morning by the Commissioner, or through his counsel, to decide whether we are going to call any evidence or not, and I am not sure at this stage whether I want to call Dr. Haynes or Dr. Taylor to testify about their review because I don't know if there is any issues for them to meet in their analysis. If you think there are, or if there are, if you will let us know if you could and we will consider that.

THE COMMISSIONER: Do you think you need equal time with Dr. Haynes? I don't know how long he had to take your report apart.

DR. SMITH: Four months.





(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

THE COMMISSIONER: I was going to ask if you could do it a little sooner than that.

MR. ROLAND: To be fair to

Dr. Haynes, and this is not criticizing the panel,

but he did provide the panel with some earlier

review, I think in October or November, of I think

the paper they did, or a draft paper so that the

panel does not come to Dr. Haynes' analysis entirely

fresh.

THE COMMISSIONER: I wonder if you could do it within a month, if you could let us know within a month if you take any issue with that, you can let us know by letter or any other form.

DR. BUEHLER: May I talk briefly with the attorney who is representing me?

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, certainly. (Off record discussion held between Ms. Neslund and Dr. Buehler.)

THE COMMISSIONER: The eyes of the world are upon you, if you would like to go outside?

DR. BUEHLER: We will have to defer an answer to that question until the end of the day.

THE COMMISSIONER: Oh, all right,



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that is certainly better than a month. All right, Mr. Roland.

MS. CRONK: I don't think that is the question he was referring to.

MR. ROLAND: I am being fed a question but I don't quite understand it yet, so I will have to defer for the moment.

MR. TOBIAS: Will it take you four months?

THE COMMISSIONER: I wonder what is the position as far as Mr. Sopinka and Mr. Strathy are concerned?

MR. BROWN: We have no questions, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: I see, there is no problem there. Mr. Strathy will or will not be available?

MS. FORSTER: Mr. Strathy is making his final argument at trial right now and expects to be here at noon.

THE COMMISSIONER: Then there is no problem there at all. What about Mr. Percival?

I spoke with

Mr. Percival last evening and upon reviewing the evidence to date we find we have no questions of

MR. YOUNG:



Smith, Buehler, Wallace, Kusiak, cr.ex. (Roland)

the panel.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Then

that solves some problems.



F M/PS Did Mr. Strathy give any indication of how long he might be? He's not coming on until after all these others.

MS. FORSTER: He expects to be a minimum of two hours, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. Well, that solves I think Mr. Lamek's problem. He is moon-lighting this afternoon. I didn't put it in the contract that he couldn't.

Yes, how are you now?

MR. ROLAND: Well, I think I understand the question. Let me try it again.

Q. On reviewing page vi beginning with "The loose ends", one of the things we dealt with was data concering who was directly responsible for the actual delivery of the care of the patients who died and you indicated that you did do a statistical analysis of the signing off of the digoxin medications. Is that how I understand your evidence? And that you found no statistically significant result from that study, that is, it didn't seem to point to one individual or another.

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

A. This was part of the Death/Death Comparison Study. As you can imagine, we did collect



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

huge volumes of data and it is difficult for me
to remember the details of everything precisely, but
my general impression is, or my general recollection
is that we saw no pattern with respect to who signed
off on medications similar to the pattern that we
observed for who was on duty; in other words, the
duty schedules were not specific to patient
assignments.

- Q. Do you mean by that that the data wasn't available or that it was available and you didn't find any one or more nurses or doctors as statistically significant in administering digoxin prescribed? I take it what you were looking to was the signed off administration of the drug.
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And that indicates, I take it, who administered the drug.
- A. That is correct. In terms of the Death/Death Comparison Study, there was no, as I recall, statistically significant association between particular individuals who signed off on given medications and deaths during the epidemic period.
 - Q. Yes, right. Thank you.



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. Well, then,

can I formally call on you, Mr. Brown?

MR.BROWN: We have no questions, Mr.

Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Young?

MR. YOUNG: No questions, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Is it Ms. Solomon?

Do you have any questions?

MS. SOLOMON: No questions, Mr.

Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: No questions. Mr.

Labow?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. LABOW:

Q. Good morning. My name is

Stephen Labow and we represent a number of the

parents of children involved in this. I only have
a few short questions.

Dealing with your recommendation on the bottom of page 28 which you have just dealt with. My question concerns the data that the hospital actually kept. Do you know how long the hospital had kept that kind of data?

A. (DR. BUEHLER) No, I don't.

The information that we used for construction of





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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

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Figure 3 went back to January 1st, 1976. So that at least as you look at the figures in our report we can say that that data was available back to that time but prior to that I cannot tell you that.

- Did you only use the available 0. hospital data in compiling Figure 3 or did you use other data that you have obtained?
- The data that we obtained in compiling Figure 3 was based on information that we obtained from the hospital.
 - Q. Do you know who kept that data?
- We received information from the Α. Medical Records Department, the Admissions Department, the Hospital Administration, the Cardiology Department, the Pathology Department and, to be honest, I cannot recall precisely whether it was the Administration or Medical Records or Admissions or another department that kept the information we used in Figure 3.
- Now, do you know if the data was used for any particular purpose?
- I do not know exactly how the hospital uses that information. Prior to our arrival at the hospital we were made aware of an investigation



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

that had been begun by a member of the hospital staff using information that the hospital collected. I believe that that investigation at the hospital had started, did not begin until after this event. So, I cannot speak to the types of uses the hospital put all of that information.

- Q. Now, how specific was the data kept? For example, did it include time of death?
- A. I do not recall. The key source of the information in Figure 3 was a document called the Monthly Death List and I do not recall whether or not that document had time of death.
- A. (DR.SMITH) I do recall it did not have time of death. It had a numerical order on the left, 1 through 30 or 31, and the deaths occurring -- that would correspond to each day of the month -- and then the death occurring on that particular day for the month.
- Q. And that was for all the wards in the hospital?
- A. (DR. SMITH) And it had also a Ward of Death, as I recall, and it may have had some other column, but that would be the Monthly Death List and they did not have the time of death,



Smith, Buehler, Wallace, Kusiak cr. ex. (Roland)

as I recall it.

Q. Do you know if other than the Monthly Death List there was any other particular information kept recording deaths at the hospital?

A. (DR. BUEHLER) I believe that there was other information.

A. (DR. WALLACE) The Pathology
Department obviously would maintain a list of the
autopsies that they had done and we were able to
use information from that, information from the
Cardiology Department to cross check the hospital
death list.

A. (DR. BUEHLER) It might be helpful to refer to a certain section of the report. If you look at page 5 we said that:

"Since the location of death within
the hospital as defined on the monthly
death report was sometimes in error --THE COMMISSIONER: I haven't found

this yet.

DR. BUEHLER: I'm sorry, it is...

MR. LABOW: It is in the middle of the paragraph beginning, "In addition..."

THE COMMISSIONER: Oh, yes, yes, thank



our report.

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)
you.

A. And to skip a bit:

"...monthly death reports were checked against records from the Departments of Pathology, Cardiology, Cardiac Surgery, and clinical computers to ascertain...the correct location of death as far as wards are concerned."

Those are the different departments that had some information on deaths that we used in

Q. Now, prior to compiling Figure 3, did you compare all of these records to ensure that Figure 3 was accurate?

A. What we did was within a few days after arriving at the Hospital use the Monthly Death Report and Monthly Census Information to compile a graph that resembled Figure 3. We felt that it was very important that all of the deaths, that the location of deaths be defined as accurately as possible and that is why we cross checked with so many different references.

MR. LABOW: Thank you. I have no further questions.



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THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, thank you, Mr.

Labow.

Mr. Tobias?

MR. TOBIAS: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TOBIAS:

Q. Good morning. My name is
Warren Tobias and I act for the family of Jordan
Hines. I believe in response to some questions that
Mr. Lamek asked the day before last, and I am directing
this question specifically to Dr. Buehler, you indicated
that it was your information that in preparing his
information for the report Dr. Nadas focussed on
what was in the chart and it was your impression
that he ignored whatever digoxin information he
had at that time. Do I have that evidence correctly?

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

A. That is not quite correct.

The information that Dr. Nadas used in developing his assessments was the hospital chart. Now, I cannot speak on behalf of Dr. Nadas in terms of exactly what he looked at in the charts.

- Q. All right. Do you know the extent to which Dr. Nadas used post mortem digoxin information?
 - A. In developing his assessments



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

for us and because his assessments were based on the use of the hospital charts, it is possible that he may have had some of that information because it was in the chart but the types of impressions that we were asking for were clinical impressions based on the clinical pattern of death. That's what we were asking him to give us an assessment of.

- Q. Right.
- A. The clinical pattern of death as a clinician, what is your impression of the timing of this child's death, what is your impression of the pattern of this child's death.
- Q. All right. Is it fair to say then that in coming up with his own analysis, given the terms of reference that you have just referred to, he would in effect be looking only at the information in the hospital chart and would therefore not be looking at information which may have become available many months later after death in terms of digoxin readings in preserved tissue?
- A. That's right, we gave him the charts to make his assessments.
- Q. And in fact that is what he was asked to do was to give his impression as a



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:) clinician.

- A. That is correct.
- Q. Now, I take it that obviously he did not have an opportunity to see any of these children. Did he have an opportunity and did he take advantage of that opportunity, if so, to discuss the condition of particular children with the clinicians who were treating them at the relevant time?
- A. No, his assessment was not based on interviews with the clinicians who were responsible for the care of the children, it was based exclusively on hospital charts.
- Q. All right. Now, with respect to his own ratings.
 - A. Yes.
- Q. I take it therefore that when he gives an opinion as to whether the death was expected and consistent with clinical condition what he is talking about is expected and consistent with clinical conditions as revealed by the chart by the child's condition while hospitalized.
 - A. That is correct.
 - Q. All right. By the same token I



Smith, Buehler, Wallace, Kusiak cr. ex. (Tobias)

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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

would take it then that in coming to his conclusion with respect to the mode of death being consistent with special concern regarding digoxin intoxication, he would be directing his mind again to the terminal events as disclosed by the chart.

- A. That's what we asked him to do.
- Q. All right. And that would be looking for signs of digoxin toxicity which are exhibited clinically such as vomitting and other perhaps more specific characteristics, am I correct in that?
- A. We asked him to look at the clinical pattern of death, correct.
- Q. Okay, fine. Now, at page 13 of the report there is a discussion regarding the criteria for category A deaths and category B deaths and I must admit that I find it slightly confusing, I am hoping that perhaps you can help me. You indicate that with respect to category A the children would have had to exhibit any one of four particular characteristics, one of which was, and I quote:

"...mode of death scored 'consistent with special concern' regarding



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

possible digoxin intoxication by the consultant cardiologist..."

And then in category B as I understand it, there were two factors: the reference time having to be between midnight and 6 a.m. and,

"...mode of death scored 'consistent'
with possible digoxin intoxication
but without any of the Category A
criteria;"

Now, do I have that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Now, what I am concerned about is this. With respect to category B when you say the child would have exhibited a characteristic that the "...mode of death scored 'consistent' with possible digoxin intoxication..." my question is scored by whom, again, the consulting cardiologist or the pharmacologist or the pathologist?

A. That was Dr. Nadas' score, the consultant cardiologist.

Q. All right. So that in effect Dr. Nadas looked at two different tests or, if I can priorize them, tests going to two different levels and that there is a qualitative difference I





Smith, Buehler, Wallace, Kusiak cr. ex. (Tobias)

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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

take it then between the mode of death being scored consistent with special concern and, on the other hand, the mode of death being scored consistent with possible digoxin intoxication.



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

Do I confuse you and muddy the

waters --

A. I don't quite understand that question.

Q. Let me try it this way. Is it possible given the fact that it was Dr. Nadas who was making the judgment on both things, is it possible, for instance, that he might find that there was a child whose death was not consistent with special concern but whose death on the other hand was consistent with possible digoxin intoxication?

- A. Yes, that is correct.
- Q. Yes. So there are two

different tests?

A. Actually there are three levels to that question. One is the clinical pattern of death was inconsistent to his impression with digoxin intoxication; it could have been consistent or consistent with special concern. So there were three possible responses to that question.

Q. All right. Well, my question specifically is this: As you know I act for the



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER) family of Jordan Hines.

A. Yes.

Q. If you look at Dr. Nadas' report with respect to Infant Hines, Dr. Nadas was of the opinion that his mode of dying was not consistent with special concern regarding digoxin intoxication. All right?

THE COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry, which number is it?

MR. TOBIAS: No. 057, I believe, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: That is 02-57?

MR. TOBIAS: 02-057. It appears

at page 65 of the Report, and in particular that

passage that I am most concerned with appears on

page 66 of the Report.

Q. And I see the consultant cardiologist scored the timing of death as expected and consistent with clinical status and the mode of death as inconsistent with digoxin intoxication.

- A. That is correct.
- Q. All right. What I am getting at is this: I take it then that with respect to



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

Category A I read from that that Dr. Nadas probably would not have scored that death as consistent with special concern. Do I have that correct?

A. Yes. He scored it -- his impression of the clinical pattern of death was that it was inconsistent with digoxin intoxication. However, that baby is a Category A death I believe.

THE COMMISSIONER: Category A because

of the --

yes.

DR. BUEHLER: For other criteria,

MR. TOBIAS: Q. That baby is a Category A death because he exhibits two of the four criteria in that Dr. Kauffman scored him 3 on the 1 to 5 digoxin scale, and there was concern expressed by Dr. deSa that the available pathological findings did not fully explain the cause of death.

Now for those reasons Hines is

Category A. We don't know whether he might have

fallen into Category B in that Dr. Nadas may have

made a finding that the death was "consistent with

possible digoxin intoxication".

Now do I have that correct or am I



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

reading too much into these categories?

A. No, no. The way the categories are constructed if you have any one of these positive markers then you are Category A, so this is an example of a child who did not have a positive marker with respect to the timing of death, who did not have one of those positive markers with respect to Dr. Nadas' clinical impression of the mode of death --

Q. Yes.

A. -- but did have a positive marker based on Dr. Kauffman's score and Dr. deSa's assessment of the available pathology material but Dr. deSa felt in that case he -- I don't remember his exact words, but he felt he could not establish cause of death based on available pathology.

Q. All right. This is the point
I am driving at and I am trying to state it as
succinctly as I can, because the last thing I want
to do at this stage of the proceedings is to muddy
the waters.

You agree with me that there were two different tests, all right, regarding the mode



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)


of dying, consistent with special concern regarding digoxin intoxication and consistent with possible dig. intoxication, and that those are two --

THE COMMISSIONER: I think one is just a matter of degree, is it not?

DR. BUEHLER: Yes.

MR. TOBIAS: Q. I believe it is a matter of degree. Is it your understanding on the reading of Dr. Nadas' report because he scored death as inconsistent with digoxin intoxication that the Hines death wouldn't fit into either of those tests?

- A. Yes.
- Q. Okay.
- A. If I understand your question
 I think you are saying because he scored it
 inconsistent he therefore did not score it consistent or consistent with special concern.
- Q. Right. Now that is on Dr. Nadas' review based upon the chart and upon what he found clinically?
 - A. That is correct.
- Q. Now you agree, however, that because Dr. Kauffman scored the baby a 3, that



Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kusiak cr.ex. (Tobias)

G6

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

obviously he had some concern in his own mind with respect to digoxin involvement?

A. Let us turn to the criteria that Dr. Kauffman used. That my help.

Q. All right. Fine.

A. If you look at Dr. Kauffman's appendix, Appendix 1, it is a three-page appendix, we are looking at the top of the third page.

MR. TOBIAS: Page 56, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, at the very end of the report, yes.

A. Rating 3: Patients given this rating were characterized by (1) presence of digoxin in exhumed and/or fixed tissues of patients for whom digoxin was not prescribed; (2) a clinical course not inconsistent with digoxin intoxication.

That is Dr. Kauffman's impression of the clinical course.

Q. All right. In fact Dr.
Kauffman has been here and we have had the benefit
of hearing his evidence.

A. Yes.

Q. I take it that you probably haven't been asked to read that evidence but I can



Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kusiak cr.ex. (Tobias)

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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

tell you that the evidence he gave here is indeed consistent with the definitions he used in giving a rating of 3 in that he did have some concern.

Now the difference, if there is one, between the conundrum of Dr. Nadas' view and Dr. Kauffman's view I take it would be resolved in part, and only in part, on the basis that Dr. Kauffman was not asked to ignore the post mortem findings of digoxin, and in fact had that very present in his mind when he rated the baby.

Do you agree with that?

A. I wouldn't care to secondguess Dr. Kauffman's thought process.

Q. Okay. Fine. Let me go on.

THE COMMISSIONER: I wonder is it
the same subject?

MR. TOBIAS: This would be an appropriate time, Mr. Commissioner. I was about to move into a different area.

THE COMMISSIONER: Fine. We will take twenty minutes.

--- recess.

--- on resuming.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr. Tobias.



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MR. TOBIAS: Thank you, Mr.


Commissioner.

Q. Just before the break I was addressing a question to the panel which I think in fairness involved a degree of speculation. I would like to rephrase the question so that it contains less of a speculative degree, and I would like to paraphrase the reference by indicating that I understand the rules and the restrictions under which Dr. Buehler is testifying; ergo I do not direct the question so much at him as I do to his colleagues on the panel.

My question is simply this: We have evidence before the Commission already from one of your own consultants, Dr. Kauffman, that he had a very high degree of concern, and I am paraphrasing but I think accurately, with respect to the possible digoxin involvement in the death of Jordan Hines.

Now without telling you what other witnesses have verified and echoed that same view, I can tell you that there is other evidence before the Commission from other experts which tends to verify that view.

We know by virtue of his terms of



reference and the entire scope of what he was asked to do that Dr. Kauffman, by necessary implication, was involved very deeply with post mortem digoxin readings. And in fact in the reference that was made before the break to his Rating No. 3, that was one of the factors he took into account.

Evidence has been given here that with respect to Dr. Nadas he did not look specifically at post mortem digoxin readings but looked at it clinically only.

I would ask you to speculate to this degree: the apparent inconsistency between the view of Dr. Kauffman, his special concern with digoxin involvement, and the view Dr. Nadas expressed that the mode of dying was not consistent with concern for digoxin toxicity, is one possible explanation to that the very fact that by his terms of reference Dr. Nadas was not looking at the post mortem values?

(ANSWERS BY DR. WALLACE)

A. I feel really that we cannot comment on what Dr. Nadas was thinking when he made this decision.

Q. All right. Let me ask this



(ANSWERS BY DR. WALLACE)

and we will leave it there: Do we agree that in forming an opinion regarding the child's condition clinically one would have to be concerned with events during life as opposed to information which became available after death? Can we go that far? Can we agree on that?

- A. Yes.
- A. (Dr. Smith) Yes.
- Q. All right. Thank you.

Now with respect to the discussions that occurred the day before last at Volume 90, and I am referring to pages 236 and 237 of the transcript, Mr. Commissioner - this goes to the question of the relative risk of death between Wards 4A and 4B.

I believe your evidence was that the relative risk of death with respect to those two wards was 4.1 with a 95% confidence limit, giving you a range of 2.1 to 6.0.

Now just so that I understand what the statistics stand for, am I correct that what that means is that the relative risk of death occurring on 4A was anywhere from 2.1 to 6.0 times higher on 4A than on 4B? Do I have that correctly?



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(ANSWERS BY MR. KUSIAK)

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
Α. With a certain probability; 95% probability.

Okay. Fine.

Now with respect to Ward 4B your evidence was that there was a small increase seen in the last three months of the epidemic, and that the relative risk gave you a mean value of 1.5. Again with the 95% confidence limit so that the range was .7 to 3.2.

Now I take it by that you mean that the relative risk of death occurring on Ward 4B during the epidemic period was about 1.5 and the range would have been anywhere from .7 to 3.2; is that correct?

- Α. Yes, with 95% probability.
- Now I also understood your Q. evidence to be that because the low end of that range was less than 1, you found that the rise in death on 4B during that period was not statistically significant.
- Yes, at the 95% confidence Α. limit.
- Q. So I think it is fair to conclude from that that basically the epidemic you



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(ANSWERS BY MR.KUSIAK)

discovered and that you documented was particular in fact to Ward 4A. Is that also correct?

A. The epidemic that we could show was on 4A, yes.


Q. Now we are obviously concerned here with babies who were treated on 4A/4B, some of the deaths having occurred on 4B, and it is obvious that the point of this exercise is to enquire as to how and by what means those babies came to their deaths.

My question to you is this: Even though you found that the rise in deaths on 4B was not statistically significant, does that factor in and of and by itself mean that the same factors that were occurring on 4A could not also have been happening on 4B?

A. Well, again I deal with -my business is probabilities, and the fact that
something is not statistically significant does not
mean there is no effect there.

Q. All right. Fine. And it also doesn't mean that it can't happen I take it?

- A. Paraphrasing it, yes.
- Q. Okay. Fine.



Now with respect to the conclusions to your report, I believe in the Conclusions section to the report there is a line, and I can't put my hands on it right now, but is it one of the findings of this study that in fact the epidemic period came to an end in March of 1981?

(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

A. That is correct. We state that on page 28 of the report, at the beginning of the recommendations.

Q. All right. Now that comment obviously can assist us in no greater manner than the time frame during which your study covered. In other words I believe that the periods covered went to June 1982 or was it July 1982?

A. July of 1982.

Q. All right. So you make no comment on whether or not there was a similar phenomenon beyond July of 1982? Do I have that correct?

A. We don't make any statement about that beyond July 1982.

A. (Dr. Buehler) May I add to Dr. Smith's answer?



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Q. Yes.


(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

A. We did however, blook at some deaths which occurred in July, August, September and October of 1982.

Q. Your conclusions were that that did not amount to an epidemic?

A. In response to the similar question that Mr. Lamek asked I believe yesterday, we did not pursue this to a similar extent and therefore I cannot say with certainty was there or was there not an epidemic.

We did, however, look at some of the patterns of death that occurred in July, August, September and October 1982 and based on that examination of those deaths our conclusion was that there was no clustering of deaths with respect to the particular time or ward as we observed during the period July 1980 through March 1981.



Smith, Buehler, Wallace, Kusiak, cr.ex. (Tobias)

/DM/ak

Q. Now, I believe, Dr. Buehler, that you gave evidence yesterday, and please correct me if I have misinterpreted this, that related to the death roommate study. I thought that what you were saying is that the children who died generally had more severe anatomical heart abnormalities than their roommates who did not die. Do I have that evidence correctly?

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

A. That is not correct. What we did say was that we used an indicator of nursing time required for care, and for those roommate survival comparisons where information was available. In most cases the child who died required more nursing time than the other children who were in the room at the same time that child suffered his or her terminal event.

Q. So that it doesn't necessarily then go to the anatomical problem?

A. That is correct. The way we had it it was an indicator of the nursing time required for the care of that child.

Q. I take it Jordan Hines was part of that study?

. I cannot recall whether or



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

not Jordan Hines was one of the patients for whom we had information available for the child or for the roommates. In other words, to make that comparison we needed to have this normal score for the child and for one or more roommate. There were some children for whom that information was not available, or both. I do not recall whether or not Jordan Hines was one of those included in those comparisons.

- Q. Now we know, because we have evidence before the Commission, that Jordan Hines had no anatomical or structural heart defects. I take it that that really is irrelevant to your comments because that would not tell us how much nursing time he required given his condition.
- A. The nursing time scores were not based on anatomic defects.
- Q. Fine. As well, I would like to take you to page 28, particularly the last full paragraph of your report under "Recommendations", and I am going to paraphrase to save time.

Do I take it from that that what you are indicating is that the regular surveillance program which you recommend is something that could have been implemented at or prior to the epidemic




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(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

period given the then data that the Hospital had.

- A. The information to construct a curve such as is shown in Figure 3, not exactly like this one but roughly parallelling this one, would be readily available at the Hospital.
 - Q. And I take it the significance of Figure 3 is really by itself to show a dramatic rise in the occurrence of mortality?
 - A. It shows that there was a sharp increase in mortality, yes.
 - Q. My point is this that having observed a sharp rise in the pattern of mortality one could then be put on notice and make other enquiries.
 - A. One would have to try to determine what the source of that rise was.
 - Q. Do I have it correctly that at the given time that I am concerned with, this will be actually somewhat prior to the start of the epidemic in July of 1980, the normal data that the Hospital gathered and had in their files and in their computer banks was sufficient to give them the same information in effect that your Figure 3 would have given them.



Smith, Buehler, Wallace, Kusiak, cr.ex. (Tobias)

(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

A. Except - yes, the answer is yes. However, with one caveat, and that is on a month by month basis one cannot project what is going to happen the next month. So this figure in a sense gives us the perspective of time to be able to really give a - to be able to observe the full profile of this epidemic curve.

For example, if one were to slide a paper across and stop just short, for example of say July, or rather August 1980, one might not have the same information and it would take quite a good deal of information to decide whether in fact an epidemic was about to happen.

Q. When we are dealing though with a nine month period I take it that as we get further into that time period the rise becomes more obvious?

A. Yes.

Q. And that if you look at the figures in September, it becomes a little bit more obvious than it would in August and ergo if you look at it in October a little bit more obvious still.

A. That is correct.




Smith, Buehler, Wallace, Kusiak, cr.ex. (Tobias)

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(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

Q. So that am I correct in understanding that what would have had to be done given the fact the Hospital had the basic data, was they would have had to basically have asked the question and put the figures together, is that correct? I am talking about mechanically now.

- A. Mechanically, yes.
- Q. Now, at the time with which we are concerned, do you know, do you have any information whether or not the Hospital had on staff an epidemiologist?
- A. (Dr. Wallace) I believe the Hospital does have an epidemiologist, however she is attached to the Infectious Disease Unit and only works in that unit.
- Q. Was there an epidemiologist on staff prior to July of 1980 to your knowledge?
- A. (Dr. Wallace) I only know of the one attached to the Infectious Disease Unit.
- Q. And do you know when she came on staff?
- A. (Dr. Wallace) No, I am sorry,
 I do not know.
 - Q. Dr. Smith, do you have any



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information?


A. (Dr. Smith) I believe she came on staff in July of 1981.

Q. Now, at the time of the events with which we are concerned, going back to the summer, early summer/late spring of 1980, I understand that the Chief of Pediatrics was Dr. Carver. Dr. Buehler, do I have it right that at one point Dr. Carver was a member of CDC?

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

A. When I came to Toronto and was first introduced to Dr. Carver, Dr. Carver told me that he was a former member of the Epidemic Intelligence Service of CDC.

- Q. The day before last when you were answering, he is almost a doctor at this point, Mr. Lamek's questions, I understand that you advised Mr. Lamek that Dr. Carver's capacity as far as you knew was that he was a former member of the Epidemic Intelligence Service, and indeed that was the capacity which you first occupied when you went to the Centres, is that correct?
 - A. Yes, thatis correct.
- Q. Now, I have examined Exhibit 184, Mr. Commissioner, which is the CV of Dr. David



Smith, Buehler, Wallace, Kusiak, cr.ex. (Tobias)

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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

H. Carver, and it would appear in fact that he was attached to the U.S. Public Health Service,

Epidemic Intelligence Service from 1956 to 1958,
and was a member of the Research Division of

Infectious Diseases, a branch of the U.S. Public

Health Service from 1961 to 1963. Can you tell

me, Dr. Buehler, what is a member of the Epidemic

Intelligence Service, can you just tell me what

those duties are, what background you have to have?

A. First of all I should tell you that my description of the duties of an EIS Officer, or an Epidemic Intelligence Service officer are based on my experience and I cannot comment on how the program may have changed over the years.

Q. All right, that is fair.

A. The Epidemic Intelligence
Service officers are most physicians, there are
other members of that service who are in other
areas of health science or epidemiology. There
are a number of different types of assignments that
EIS officers may be given. In general the goal
of the EIS program is to provide first hand experience
in public health practice and epidemiology, and
to provide a service for some at the Federal level



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and for others at the State level.

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

Q. Would someone engage in such a role be involved with studying the pattern in health of both the public and private sense in the general population?

A. In my capacity as an EIS officer I have been involved in those types of studies.

Q. So that basically it requires,
I would take it, over a period of time, or it
affords one some experience and knowledge with
respect to the study which is what epidemiology is
all about.

A. That is a goal of the EIS program.

Q. And such an officer would at least I take it have some rudimentary training and background in understanding for the study of epidemics?

A. Yes, again based on my experience in the program.

MR. TOBIAS: Those are all my questions, Mr. Commissioner, thank you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. Yes, all



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right, thank you. Mr. Shanahan, are you ready?

MR. SHANAHAN: Mr. Shinehoft is
going to go next.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes,

Mr. Shinehoft.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SHINEHOFT:

Q. My name is Jack Shinehoft and I represent the parents of Baby Kevin Pacsai. It would appear from the report that you have made with regard to this child, which child is No. 060, and it is page 67 I believe.

A. (Dr. Smith) Are you referring to the case summaries?

- Q. Yes, the case summaries.
- A. (Dr. Smith) Yes.
- Q. The case summaries that you prepared with regard to this child. It would appear from my reading that both the clinical pharmacologists and the cardiologists as well as the pathologists agree as far as the rating of this child; would you agree with that?

A. (Dr. Buehler) Let me just confirm this, this is Child 060?

THE COMMISSIONER: Would you agree that this is what they say?



Smith, Buehler, Wallace, Kusiak, cr.ex. (Shinehoft)

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MR. SHINEHOFT: Yes.

DR. BUEHLER: Dr. Nadas has the timing of death of this child as unexpected and inconsistent with clinical status. He scored the pattern of death as consistent with special concern regarding digoxin intoxication.

Dr. Kauffman's score was 4 on the 1 to 5 scale.

MR. SHINEHOFT: Q. Yes, and my question is would you say that those are shared views as to the involvement of digoxin with this particular child?

THE COMMISSIONER: No, I don't think they can be asked that. They can be asked if that is what their experts told them.

MR. SHINEHOFT: All right.

THE COMMISSIONER: That is as far as that can go, isn't that right? Isn't that what I understand the rules are?

DR. BUEHLER: Yes.

MR. SHINEHOFT: Would you like to answer that question?

THE COMMISSIONER: That is what they say, that is what the report says.

DR. SMITH: That is in fact - those



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are the scores according to whatever criteria they used that were given to us for that particular child.

MR. SHINEHOFT: Q. Would you say that those two views are somewhat consistent in terms of an opinion?

A. (Dr. Buehler) Let us read the criteria that Dr. Kauffman used for Category 4. Turning again to the appendices, the bottom part of the second page, the first appendix:

- "Rating 4. Patients receiving this rating had the following characteristics:
- Clinical course highly suggestive of digoxin toxicity;
- 2. Antemortem serum, postmortem serum, and/or postmortem tissue digoxin concentrations all consistent with digoxin toxicity;
- 3. Cardiac disease which could predisposed the patient to digoxin toxicity."
- Q. Yes. Would you care to comment as to whether you feel that Dr. Kauffman's opinion and Dr. Nadas' opinion are shared in terms of this child?



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A. (Dr. Buehler) I think that would be going beyond what we can say based precisely on what our consultants told us.



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I M/PS Q. I see. But you would agree that a rating given by Dr. Kauffman of 4 out of 5 is a fairly high rating and it is one that is only given I believe to one other child.

A. (DR. SMITH) 02064.

Q. So, there were only two children, and correct me if I'm wrong, in your study that received a rating of 4 out of 5 by Dr. Kauffman?

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

A. Let me just check what Dr.

Smith just said. Let me check something very briefly

In the text on page 17 -- actually,

let's turn to page 16, the last sentence on that page begins:

"The distribution of scores regarding digoxin intoxication as the cause of death..."

And then if you go on to the top of the next page, score 4, and if you look at the appendix which provides what we have referred to as a line list and look at the digoxin scores that Dr. Kauffman provides there are four patients with a score of 4.

Q. And that is 4 out of how many?



Smith, Buehler, Wallace, Kusiak cr. ex. (Shinehoft)

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

THE COMMISSIONER: 36.

MR. SHINEHOFT: 36, yes.

DR. BUEHLER: Yes. Actually, in these assessments the evaluation for the Woodcock baby was included. So there were actually 37 that Dr. Kauffman did, I think we mentioned that the other day.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, all right.

DR. BUEHLER: So, of the 37 that

Dr. Kauffman looked at there were 4 that had a score

of 4.

- Q. All right, thank you. And there was only one I believe, Cook, that had a score of 5.
- A. There was one child with a score of 5, yes.
- Q. Okay. If I could refer to the conclusions that you have in your report, I believe it is page 28, the second paragraph. I am sorry, it is recommendations, page 28, you state:

"For the future, it is important to recognize that no hospital is immune to the possibility of intentional harm to patients by hospital employees



article?

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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

or others in the hospital. Situations of this sort have occurred before and may well occur again."

You have got Footnote 3, which is an article in the New England Journal of Medicine. I assume that you have examined that article?

- A. Yes.
- Q. Have all of you examined that
- A. (DR. SMITH) Yes.
- A. (DR. WALLACE) Yes.
- Q. I believe, Mr. Commissioner,

it was filed as Exhibit No. 152.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.

MR. SHINEHOFT: Q. Now, were you aware of the situations that were referred in the article before you commenced your study at the hospital?

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

- A. In preparing to leave

 Atlanta to come to Toronto I believe that I had done

 some -- that I had found that article and I did bring

 that article with me to Toronto.
 - Q. So you were aware that situations



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

of not the exact magnitude but situations similar to what may have happened in Toronto have occurred in other jurisdictions, is that correct?

- Yes. After I learned that I Α. would be coming to Toronto I was made aware of that article and I brought it with me.
- And did you perchance examine the references contained in that article; more specifically, references 5, 6 and 7?
- I would like to have a copy of the article shown to me, please.
- 0. All right. I don't know if the article was distributed, Mr. Commissioner. I think I have enough copies of the article that I can give to most of the counsel.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I'm sure it was.

MR. SHINEHOFT: I am not sure it


was.

all right.

THE COMMISSIONER: Very well. Yes,

DR. BUEHLER: Would you please state the question again?

MR. SHINEHOFT: Yes. You say that you



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

examined that article, Doctor, is that correct?

- A. Yes, I read it.
- Q. You read it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And you will note in the last page there are certain references.
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Did you perchance examine references 5, 6 and 7?
 - A. No, I did not.
- Q. References to certain newspaper articles and certain situations that occurred in other jurisdictions as well, specifically New Jersey and Michigan. Were you aware of those situations, the situation at the Veterans Hospital at Ann Arbor, Michigan?
- A. This article describes an investigation at the Veterans Hospital in Ann Arbor.
- Q. Yes. So, you are aware of that from the article.
- A. Yes. I did not examine references
 4. 5 and 6.
- Q. That deals with situations that happened in jurisdictions other than in Ann Arbor,



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

Michigan, a situation in New Jersey. Were you aware of that situation as well?

- A. I did not review these and I was not aware of these situations.
- Q. Okay. But before you ever became involved in the situation in Toronto were you aware of anything, any developments that occurred in other jurisdictions similar to what may have happened in Toronto as an epidemiologist?
- A. I believe you are really getting beyond the range of my testimony.
- Q. Well, you do make certain recommendations and you do say that this situation has happened before and I was just asking you some questions arising out of your recommendations, really.
- A. Really, to be precise, I became aware of this article after I learned I was going to be coming to Toronto. I read the article prior to being here and I did not read the references that you mentioned there.
 - Q. Okay.
- A. In fact, I don't recall if I have read the references in this manuscript.
 - Q. Well, again, my question is:



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

As an epidemiologist did you have any previous knowledge or information that would be similar to what has happened or may have happened in Toronto; previous problems with hospitals and with patients and unexpected deaths in hospitals.

A. I don't recall if I had -you mean in terms of scientific pursuit?

Q. Well, in terms of information that was conveyed to you in your course of training and in your course of study as an epidemiologist, is that a problem that you would have been made aware of or studied, had reference to?

A. My hesitation is coming from some uncertainty as to whether or not I can answer that question and stay within the bounds of the rules that govern my testimony as a witness.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I think you can tell about what your experience is, Doctor, I think there is no problem about that, it is your experience.

MR. SHINEHOFT: That is all. That is all I am asking you, Doctor. I am asking you and other members of the Panel what your previous experience is as far as this type of problem is



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:) concerned.

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THE COMMISSIONER: If you had a problem in any way relating to this in your experience before.

DR. BUEHLER: As part of my training as an epidemiologist, I had not had familiarity with a problem of this type before.

THE COMMISSIONER: Where is this leading, Mr. Shinehoft?

MR. SHINEHOFT: Well, there is a recommendation made and there are certain articles referred to, and I have read those articles, Mr. Commissioner, and these questions arise out of those articles very simply.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, what is it, are you complaining about the recommendations?

MR. SHINEHOFT: No, I am not

complaining about anything at all. I just want to know the information that the members of the panel have and to question them about that information.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, have you had a sufficient answer now?

MR. SHINEHOFT: Well, perhaps other members of the panel could answer that question



Smith, Buehler, Wallace, Kusiak cr. ex. (Shinehoft)

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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

as well as to their previous knowledge of this type of situation. Dr. Wallace?

A. (DR. WALLACE) I have been involved in many infectious disease and outbreak situations. The only situation that may be similar to this one was again an outbreak of what initially was an unexplained illness in the intermediate care intensive unit at Sick Children's Hospital in January of 1982.

- Q. That is the epinephrine, vitamin E problem?
- A. (DR. WALLACE) That is correct, yes.
- Q. Dr. Smith, are you aware of any similar situations in your experience or in your educational background?

THE COMMISSIONER: I am getting a little worried about this, Mr.Shinehoft.

MR. SHINEHOFT: This is my last question.

THE COMMISSIONER: I just want to say it will take several ten ton trucks to make me draw a conclusion because it happened somewhere else, rather than it happening here, that's all.



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

DR. SMITH: I received the New
England Journal of Medicine and had read that
article before but it had not, this type of
investigation had not been part of my training and
I have been involved in outbreak investigations
outside of hospitals but not in hospitals.

MR. SHINEHOFT: Thank you very much, those are my questions.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Mr.

Shanahan?

MR. TOBIAS: Mr. Commissioner, I apologize to you, sir, I don't mean to disrupt these proceedings but I did have one very short area.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

MR. TOBIAS: I will be honest with you it was on the opposite flip side of my notes and that's why I missed it, if I could have your indulgence for a few minutes.

THE COMMISSIONER: No harm done. (FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TOBIAS:)

Q. The point that I would like to bring out is simply this. I understand that in beginning your exercise it was the hospital itself that provided you with draft terms of reference?



yes.

A.	(MR.	SMITH)	That	is	correct,

Q. I also understand that the terms of reference as they ultimately appear in your report are almost identical to the terms of reference prepared by the hospital. Was there any avenue, any suggestion made to you by the hospital, any area of concern that they raised or anything that they asked you to do that you did not pursue?

A. (DRS SMITH) We pursued everything that they requested.

Q. Okay, fine. Now, with respect to your own thought process ---

A. (DR. BUEHLER) May I just add as best as I can recall; to the best of our recollection, to the best of what I can remember. Are you asking specifically about the terms of reference?

Q. I am really going beyond that. What I am asking you is this. Was there any major undertaking or, I won't use the term major, it is slightly pejorative, was there any significant undertaking which the hospital asked you to look at which you refused to take a look at that you can recall?

A. (DR. BUEHLER) In terms of



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:) specific hypotheses?


- Q. And in terms of specific methodology.
- A. Okay, the hospital did not recommend to us specific methodologies. The hospital did give us a set of terms of reference.
- Q. Were there any avenues that you can recall their asking you to pursue that you refused to pursue?
- A. (DR. SMITH) I do not recall not pursuing anything that they were interested in.
- Q. All right. And is it not fair to say that if there was such a substantial or significant avenue you would recall that?
 - A. (DR. SMITH) Yes.
- Q. All right, fine. Now, with respect to your own thought processes and your own analysis, and you have obviously devoted a major portion of your life really to the preparation of this report, today, if you had to do it all over again, are there any major changes that you would make to your methodology?
- A. (DR. BUEHLER) Let me step back. We are here to testify on the findings that



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

we made and to avenues of investigation that we took followed in a step-wise manner more or less, as we have already mentioned, using as best we could the types of information that were available to us. That is as far as I care to go in answering that question.



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(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

TORONTO, ONTARIO

All right. The question Q. really is this, is it not: I asked you about avenues that the Hospital suggested that you pursue and you told me that as far as you recall whatever avenues they suggested you did pursue.

Are there any avenues today, looking back on it all, any avenues that you did not pursue that you thought were important?

I think in answer to that I can say we were not in any way limited by the terms of reference if we felt that there were other avenues which would add information to those terms of reference. That is that we would have pursued them.

Q. All right. Are you satisfied, though, with respect to the preparation of this report, the avenues that appeared to you to be most significant and the methodology that appeared to you to be most significant was pursued?

Taking into consideration A. the limits of the data that were available, we pursued it as far as we could.

MR. TOBIAS: All right. Fine. Those are all my questions. Thank you.



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THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

Mr. Shanahan.

If you don't have any regrets in life you are almost superhuman I would say. I certainly have.

Yes, Mr. Shanahan.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SHANAHAN:

Q. Good morning. My name is Shanahan and I act on behalf of the parents of two of the children, Lombardo and Dawson.

One of the things here, just if I might, on the general sort of approach you had to this time period, it struck me reading the evidence yesterday that you gave to Mr. Lamek that you were aware of various theories; you were working in close proximity to the police and a lot of other people had input too, sort of if you like, pet theories or feelings on what might have occurred there and you were aware of them. Am I clear on that? Is that right?

(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

A. We were working in physically close proximity to the police inasmuch as they were a few rooms down the hallway. I would not say that we were working close enough to be having a joint



Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kusiak cr.ex. (Shanahan)

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(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH) investigation, no.

Q. But somewhere, whether from your own previous experience or whatever, what you do is you initially approach it, as appears from the report, and you look at, and you discount, if you like, various innocent - for the use of a better word - explanations for what occurred during this time period.

On page 19 the conclusion seems to be that you say that the following variables -- you don't observe any association between death and those variables, and there are many of them. That is, the procedures that they might have had, the duration of their stay and whether they had surgery. You eliminate at the outset it appears to me the innocent or innocuous explanations for what clearly was an epidemic period.

Am I right there?

A. (Dr. Buehler) Are your reading from page 19? Are you looking at the death roommate study?

Q. Well, I am more interested there -- it seems to me what you did is you considered here not only the death roommate study, but in your



Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kusiak cr.ex. (Shanahan)

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(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

report in general as you approached, once you had assessed there was an epidemic period that you looked at possible neutral or innocent explanations, increase in patients, more severe, younger, you went through the very obvious, and as I say again neutral or innocent explanations that might very quickly have accounted for what appeared to be an epidemic. Am I right there?

A. Well, rather than use the word "neutral", we looked at all the possible situations which might have an effect on mortality.

- Q. All right.
- A. Variables that is.
- Q. It seems to me that those variables were ones that -- variables, if you call them variables -- those considerations were obvious ones that might strike any layman let alone an epidemiologist right off. Were these younger kiddies? Were they sicker kiddies?

And it struck me picking up on something that Dr. Wallace got into yesterday that in the final analysis or at least your first approach is not to zero in on staff and the presence of particular nurses or doctors initially. As I



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(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

take it your chronology initially was to see if there was an immediate innocent or neutral explanation for the occurrence?

- A. That is what we stated, yes.
- A. (Dr. Buehler) Let me amplify that slightly.

Q. Yes.

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

A. We looked at a variety of conditions that reflect patient care, et cetera, and as has been emphasized previously the indicators that we looked at, none of them showed a change coincident — a marked change coincident with the onset of what we defined as the epidemic period except for the question of ICU occupancy where we did observe that during that nine-month period there was a greater number of months where the occupancy exceeded desired levels.

- Q. All right.
- A. Then in your question you sort of combined two different parts of our study.

We then attempted or actually very early in the process we attempted to collect information that might allow us to calculate age or



Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kusiak cr.ex. (Shanahan)

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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

severity adjusted mortality rates. In other words, information that would allow us to take into account changes in age characteristics or severity characteristics of the patient population. That type of information was not available to adjust mortality rate calculations.

However, we did attempt to look at a sample of patients who began hospitalization on the cardiology ward before, during and after the epidemic period, and as stated previously there is some concern about the tabulation of that data as is presented in our report.

My question is that you immediately get into various associations and factors and that you quite quickly in the report deal with them on a statistical basis and you come to the conclusion that, yes, we have an epidemic and until we get to the position where we are talking about the presence or absence of certain nurses, until we get to there, you methodically -- you just eliminate them. They don't appear to be significant to you.

Am I right there so far?

A. We looked at a range of things



Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kusiak cr.ex. (Shanahan)

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for itself.

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

and had negative findings and didn't pursue those further.

Q. All right. And then when you get to the human level, and picking up on what Dr. Wallace said yesterday, perhaps from a medical point of view, the least palatable suggestion here becomes, would you agree, as we look back on the whole report, it becomes the most significant finding that you make in that report, and that is that when you eliminate all the other factors about age and severity, what we get right down to then is the only common factor that you finally find running through this epidemic period other than the epidemic period itself, deaths, is the presence or absence of this Nurse 401?

A. (Dr. Smith) Well, it was clearly stated that that is the strongest association that is found.

- Q. Yes.
- A. (Dr. Smith) I think that speaks
- Q. Now then as well as that here, the association that you came to or the finding that you came with respect to there being an epidemic per se,



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

in fairness as I gathered from reading the report that really it was a finding you were able to make very quickly, and on factors and data that was all contained within the Hospital -- indeed at the Hospital's fingertips and at your fingertips as you went through your review.

A. As we have said we were able to use available information within a very short time after arriving and generated a figure that resembled Figure 3 of the report.

Q. My point is that in terms of that for other areas you had to retain outside consultants, and for other areas you had to retire perhaps back to Atlanta and sit down with rather complex configurations and data and numbers, but with respect to the finding per se that there was an epidemic period and that there had been a dramatic and statistically significant increase in deaths, those facts in support of that finding were all right there within The Hospital for Sick Children? Am I right there? That is the number of patients, the number of deaths?

A. (Dr. Smith) Yes, that is correct. There are no numbers there that were



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

created. They were available at the Hospital.

Q. Yes. They were at your fingertips; they were made available and indeed by implication they were therefore at the fingertips of the Hospital itself?

A. It might be important to provide one bit of background information and it is something that your question brings to mind, and that is when we started our investigation the Hospital knew that we were coming and did everything they could to very quickly provide us with some information.

Now we don't know if the rapidity of their compliance with our request might have been affected by the fact that they had already gathered that information either in anticipation of our arriving at the Hospital or for investigations that the Hospital itself had undertaken.

But you are correct in stating that using information the Hospital provided we very shortly after arriving established that there was a sharp increase in mortality rates.

Q. Yes. Well, you added the word "shortly", and that was the last question on



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

this area. Not only was that data available right within the Hospital itself, and I put to you easily available, but secondly once you had that data the work you had to do with it, the mathematical configurations you had to do were something that could be done very quickly, and you very quickly realized you had a statistically significant amount of deaths, an epidemic?

We very shortly after arriving A. generated a figure that resembled Figure 3 using the data that was there at the time.

I don't recall whether or not we immediately did statistical tests of relative risk and confidence limits.

No, no.

But examination of Figure 3 or the ancester of Figure 3 if you will.--

> 0. Yes.

-- the precursor demonstrated a sharp increase in mortality.

All right. And that led then to your conclusion on page 28. One of the conclusions you made was that if there was a regular surveillance of mortality patterns -- so that



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

I don't misstate here I am going to read it. It is the last paragraph on page 28.

"Regular surveillance of mortality patterns in the Hospital could have identified the epidemic problem in the early fall of 1980 and thus have led to earlier corrective action. A clear excess of deaths associated with the nighttime occurence on Wards 4A/B, and perhaps related to a particular team of nurses, could have been detected by that time..."

And I take it "by that time" you are referring to the fall of 1980.

"...had a system been in place which regularly scanned death frequencies by ward and date of occurrence. The Hospital already collects on a monthly basis the data needed for such surveillance: a monthly list of deaths in the Hospital showing date and place (ward) of occurrence together with monthly ward-occupancy figures."



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

And you say in the last sentence:

"Together these two pieces of data could be simply scanned each month for ward-specific mortality rates..."

So I gather from that the data was there, that the process to find out there were increasing mortalities was a simple process. Am I right there?

A. You read the report correctly.

I think that to look at mortality rates they would need to actually calculate the rate based on deaths and mortality — based on deaths and occupancy or patient days, and it would be possible to visually monitor a pattern of deaths.

Q. All right. Now moving on -THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Shanahan,
unless you are in trouble this afternoon I would
like to break off now.

MR. SHANAHAN: No, no, I am fine.

THE COMMISSIONER: You are not in trouble for once?

MR. SHANAHAN: No. No, I am in

THE COMMISSIONER: Then we will rise

--- luncheon recess.

great shape.

until 2:30.



Smith, Buehler, Wallace, Kuziak cr. ex. (Shanahan)

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---Upon resuming at 2:35 p.m. (ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr. Shanahan.

Q. I believe I left off at the last point before lunch with respect to the data aspects there. Would you agree with me, finally dealing with that issue, that the same time effort, and really more to the point expertise that was put into review, the McMaster review, I will call it, of your report, were put into analyzing the data that was already in the hospital. It would have been known in the fall of 1980 that indeed they were dealing with an epidemic and that the characteristics of that epidemic which you have remarked upon, that is that it was located in one ward predominantly, it was predominantly associated with one nursing team, and that predominantly the deaths were occurring between the hours of midnight and 6 a.m. would have been readily apparent.

A. We know roughly how many months it took the McMaster group to prepare their report but we don't know how much time they spent working on it, and I can't answer that question.

Q. The babies that I act for are Lombardo and Dawson. With respect to Baby Dawson, Baby Dawson is in category A, as is Baby Lombardo.



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

Α. Yes.

Q. With respect to Baby Dawson, I just think to sort of summarize here, I think Dr. Nadas indicates in his notes, in his work notes, that he felt she should have been in ICU at the time of her death. I think in the chart that is at the end of your study the comment is made, or she is listed under the category:

> "That a higher level of care would have been desired."

Is that a fair enough summation of Baby Dawson's position there?

I think it is important to emphasize what that means. That was the relative scale that Dr. Nadas used and he emphasized to us, and I believe it is stated clearly in the report, that that judgment is not intended to reflect upon the judgment of the physicians at the Hospital for Sick Children.

That was using, applying the Q. standards, he had just simply, I take it, a number status on this baby and he was applying the status that he would have applied, or the criteria that he would have applied at his hospital, he didn't



Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kuziak cr. ex. (Shanahan)

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

mean it as a criticism of Sick Children's at all.

- A. That is my understanding.
- Q. One final thing with respect to Baby Dawson; on page 16 under "Pathologist's Consultation", you go through the autopsies that were performed and you give various numbers and ratios. There is one thing that concerned me, and this is about line 6, the sentence that starts:

"For three deaths..."

And it gives the case numbers:

"...the consultant pathologist expressed concern that available
autopsy findings did not fully account
for the patient's demise."

It gives the numbers, and those numbers bear out to be Woodcock, Hines and Pacsai.

Now, as I understood it from your evidence Dr. Nadas would have, and all of you had at your disposal, I may be wrong and if so you can correct me, if this assumption is wrong then it will explain it; I thought you had at your disposal all of the records and the charts that were available, and part of the Dawson record was a Coroner's Investigation, and in fact an autopsy prepared by a



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

pathologist at Sick Childrens a Dr. Kutz.

First of all, before we go any further would Dr.

Nadas have had that, do you know, at his disposal?

A. This section of the report,

"Pathologist's Consultation", deals with the evaluations done by Dr. deSa.

Q. Dr. deSa.

A. And Dr. deSa reviewed the autopsy records that were available and those were his impressions.

Q. Dr. deSa. What I am saying then, the same question then, Dr. deSa presumably would have dealt with no other pathology report other than the one prepared by the coroner, or by Sick Children's, Dr. Kutz at the request of the coroner and that are contained in the Dawson medical records, that would be what he reviewed.

A. Could I ask a question? May I have Dr. deSa's report?

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, it is an exhibit.

THE WITNESS: It is an exhibit?
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. Would you

like to see it?



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

DR. BUEHLER: Yes, please.

THE COMMISSIONER: Does anybody know

the number of that?

MR. LABOW: It is Exhibit 283.

THE COMMISSIONER: Exhibit 283.

DR. BUEHLER: Can you tell me quickly

what the number for your client is?

Q. For Dawson?

A. Yes.

Q. 02004.

A. Thank you. It has been some time since I read Dr. deSa's report since it was separate from ours. I believe that Dr. deSa provided him with the background material, the criteria that he used to make his assessment.

Q. Yes. One thing I am briefly concerned with here is we have seen this autopsy report and we have gone through it and I am not going to go through it now with you, I presume you have had it at your disposal. That autopsy report clearly goes through the surgery that was performed on this child, indicates that surgery was successful and was properly done and indicates



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

they don't find any immediate cause or explanation for the death. That really was clear. The coroner had been called in and that report has still left all of us in terms of finding an anatomical cause of death, it has left us with no cause given. I am concerned here why then Dr. deSa, if you wish to pass the question on to him, would consider that only three deaths did not fully account for the patient's demise.

A. I cannot speak for Dr. deSa's judgment.

Q. Let us move on to Lombardo.

Lombardo was a category A death. At page 13 you
talk about, at the top, after the 3, 4 number you
say:

"Lastly, the consultant attempted to suggest possible routes and times of administration of overdoses in the four cases where sufficient digoxin data to support such estimates were available."

All right, there were four cases there where Dr.

Kauffman could take you back and give you an estimated time where the drugs were given and Lombardo was one



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

of those four, is that correct?

- A. That is correct, yes.
- Q. On page 16, on the bottom, the last two sentences:

"In most patients who had been receiving prescribed doses of digoxin, it was not possible to distinguish between therapeutic and toxic digoxin levels in post mortem tissue specimens. Four patients had digoxin present in post mortem specimens without digoxin having been prescribed."

Now, again Lombardo was one of those four, is that correct?

- A. That is correct.
- Q. So Lombardo is a category A death, it is a death in which you can get fairly accurate time given to you when the digoxin might have been given prior to death, by Dr. Kauffman. As well that is one of four children where we find digoxin in tissue and it hasn't been prescribed.
- A. I think Dr. Kauffman, both in the information that he provided with us, and I cannot vouch for the information he may have provided



ANSWERS	BY	DR.	BUEHLER:)
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earlier, I think Dr. Kauffman felt that those times of administration were approximate.

- Q. Yes, he did indeed, no question.
- A. You had used the words, "fairly accurate".
- Q. All right, approximate times, but he has got four he gave as approximate times, and Lombardo is one of those as well, in addition to being a category A.
 - A. That is correct.
- Q. And as well as that there are four children in which you find in tissue a trace of digoxin where there was not any digoxin prescribed to those children, and Lombardo was one of those four as well.
 - A. That is correct.
- Q. Now, you come to Table 12 on page 47 of the report. You point out here with respect to the children, Lombardo, Inwood, Miller and Cook, one nurse, Nurse Trayner is on duty for all four of the deaths as I read that, am I right?
- A. Right. Yes, what we are saying there is given the assessments of time that Dr. Kauffman gave us for those four deaths, there



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

was only one nurse, according to our nursing calendar, who was on duty at those times in all four.

- Q. When it would be estimated by Dr. Kauffman that the dose was administered?
 - A. That is correct.
- Q. There are five others at the time, within that time period with respect to possible administration to Lombardo, Nurses 103, 104, 502, 504, and 605, and as I look at your total down at the bottom that is the only one of the four, the four that Dr. Kauffman can give us an estimate on that those nurses are on for, that is the child Lombardo, am I right there?
- A. I am sorry, are you asking me about Nurses 103, 104?
- Q. 104, 105, 502, 504 and 605.

 It seems pretty obvious that is the only child that they are on for is Lombardo.
 - A. That is correct.
- Q. And apart from just this, as
 you move to your other tables, those nurses as
 well you will agree, I don't believe, are on at
 all, or at least let us say they are not statistically



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

significant at all in terms of relative association to deaths:over this whole time period.

- A. I would have to take a moment to check that out.
- Q. Would you do that, please, and I in another part of Table 11 here ranging from 44 to 46 it seems to be perhaps 504.
- A. I am looking at the last page of Table 11.
- Q. 504 is the only one who seems to come into view at all, and I would submit to you she is statistically, she is not significant in terms of the 36 deaths, or rate of association.
- A. The relative risk for Nurse 504 is 1.1 with a confidence limit of 0.4 to 2.2. As we have mentioned earlier, that is not a statistically significant association. In fact as we have said earlier, a relative risk of 1 is indication of no association.
- Q. And the other four of the five are not even mentioned at all, those other four nurses.
- A. They do not appear on the last page of the Table 11.



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

Q. Finally, then where everyone else has tracked and that is the last two pages, pages 27 and 28 of your report; on page 27, about ten or 11 lines from the bottom there, you put in a sentence there:

"Although these observations suggest that some infants died as a result of intentional administration of digoxin overdoses, it is not possible from this investigation alone to make this determination conclusively."

I take it by that when you say, "this determination" you are talking about whether they died as a result of an intentional administration, that is the determination that you don't think you can determine conclusively, am I right there?



B/BM/ak

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

A. Yes, an epidemiologic study could not make such a determination.

page 28 under your Recommendations, skipping the first sentence for a moment you say "If it is decided,..." and then you say "...as the evidence suggests, that the increased occurrence of deaths from July 1980 through March 1981 resulted from purposeful IV overdoses of digoxin on Wards 4A/B, then it remains to be decided whether there is sufficient evidence to identify the perpetrator. This matter rests with the law enforcement authorities."

So, in that sentence here first of all you are saying that the evidence does suggest that there has been purposeful overdoses. You don't seem to have any doubt as you draft that sentence about purposeful or deliberate or on one side and intention or a lack of it on the other side, you seem to say there the evidence suggests it is purposeful and that the only question that really remains is whether there is evidence to give us identity. Do I not read that right?

A. I think it is clear that what we have said, our report does not attempt to



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

determine conclusively whether or not intentional acts were committed. That is clearly beyond the range of our investigation.

- Q. Well, that's what you say on page 27. There is no question that sentence says you can't make this determination, that's the one of intention on this report alone.
 - A. Yes.
- Q. But when you come to this sentence here you say the evidence suggests that they were caused, the increased occurrence was caused by purposeful overdoses and the only thing remains is whether there is sufficient evidence to identify the perpetrator.
- A. If others make that decision, clearly, that is not our decision to make and I would be very cautious to emphasize that word "suggest".
- Q. Well, the decision isn't yours to make whether there is sufficient evidence to identify the perpetrator but you do seem to suggest there that the matter of intent and deliberateness seems to be, the evidence seems to suggest that it was purposeful overdoses. The only thing you leave



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

open to the law enforcement people is to find out who in fact the perpetrator might be.

A. That is not the intent of that paragraph.

Q. It is not the intent, but you would agree that the wording is there to read it just as I have put it to you?

A. That is not the way I read that sentence, nor is it the way we intended it to be read.

Q. All right. If somebody then were trying to find out, except if you read my way for a moment for the sake of argument here, and were then trying to find out the perpetrator, first of all, sir, you will agree that the first sentence "The epidemic clearly ended in March of 1981", all right, and you know and we know what happened in March of 1981, digoxin was put under lock and key and that nursing team was disbanded. You know that, don't you?

- A. We are aware of that.
- Q. All right.
- A. We mentioned in the introduction to our report that the routines for prescribing



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER) digoxin were changed.

All right, and that the nursing team was disbanded. You know that? You didn't get into that and that is why I am putting it to you.

We are aware of a nurse being Α. arrested and charges being laid against her.

0. I really don't want to get into it that far.

And we were aware of the team being temporarily disbanded.

Q. All right. The team was disbanded, quite apart from ...

> A. Yes.

0. All right. And you will agree then that first of all in terms of people deciding about sufficient evidence, that in and of itself, your feeling that it clearly as you say ended, statistically you are satisfied that it ended in March of '81 and that another factor that the team was disbanded and that the drug itself went under lock and key, that is one factor that would be noteworthy. You will agree there?

> Α. It is our understanding that



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

after March, 1981, at least through the time that we were at the Hospital and I believe up to the time that our report was submitted, there were no further deaths where concern was raised about similar high levels of digoxin that were observed in some of the other cases.

- Q. Was that correct?
- A. Was that correct?
- A. (Dr. Smith) I believe that there was one.

THE COMMISSIONER: April, 1983.

DR. SMITH: In April last year.

DR. BUEHLER: That would have

been after our report was submitted.

DR. SMITH: Yes.

MR. SHANAHAN: Q. All right. But your sentence that it clearly ended in March of '81, you are satisfied that it ended but you do know two other external facts I had given to you that I think are significant and I think you will have to agree are significant and that is digoxin is put under lock and key and that that nursing team was disbanded. You will agree that is a significant factor.



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

A. I agree that those events are associated with the end of the epidemic.

Q. All right. Second of all here you will agree here in terms of sufficient evidence and other people assessing whether there is sufficient evidence, you will agree that your study itself both in all the things that it eliminates, all those factors about sex and age, the severity of their illness, over-crowding, the factors it eliminates and then the factors of association that it brings to view and highlights, you will agree, that is significant as well?

A. The word "significant" is an awkward one to use because it means one thing to a statistician and another...

Q. Well, you will agree then
that your report insofar as the study done on
Table, I think it is Table 11 that gives you the
relative risks, am I right there, is that the table?

A. Yes.

Q. Table 11 with respect to the relative risks and pointing out the presence of Nurse Trayner with respect to a predominant number of these deaths, you will agree here that



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)


again bearing in mind that paragraph on page 28 about whether there is sufficient evidence to identify the perpetrator, that that table in itself purely on a matter of association is another piece of evidence that one can look at with respect to identifying the perpetrator?

A. One of the concerns that we have had all along is that the epidemiologic findings not be misused and I think it is extremely important to remember that we are not criminal investigators, that we are dealing with observed associations based on the information at hand. We did observe a statistically significant association between Nurse 401 and the occurrence of deaths during that nine-month period.

Q. All right, that is all I wanted to get at.

Finally then at the top of page 28, and I bear in mind here, and I am not trying to slide something by you here, it commences on the bottom of page 27 and it commences on the hypothetical, if the epidemic was a result of intentional acts.

All right, you say there are several noteworthy patterns in the series of crimes committed. I take



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

it the rest of the paragraph is premised on that hypothesis.

A. Yes.

Q. But to coin a phrase you used yesterday you then seem to give a profile of the person, the characteristics or training or skill of the person that might in fact be the perpetrator and you say, starting at line 2:

"Because the epidemic went
unrecognized for almost 9 months,
suggesting that the perpetrator had
enough clinical knowledge to choose
victims whose deaths would not
initially be considered suspicious."
There is one factor. You say:
"The perpetrator would also need to
have been a person who had unlimited
access to patients over a 9 month
period."

There is another. Finally:

"Neither the presence of such a person in a patient room if observed nor the act of his/her handling an IV line during night-time hours



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(ANSWERS E	BY DR	BU:	EHLER
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"would arouse suspicion."

Finally then in terms of that profile you will agree that all members of that nursing team, and specifically Nurse Trayner, meets those three characteristics of the profile that you put there.

- A. You have taken one step more than we chose to take in that paragraph.
 - Q. Okay.
- A. That paragraph is clearly a matter of speculation, as I stated yesterday.
- Q. Well, it is speculative about the intention part but it isn't speculative about the characteristics of the profile itself.
- A. Every word in that paragraph is prefaced by the phrase "If the epidemic was the result of intentional acts". I think it is extremely important that these findings not be over-stated.

THE COMMISSIONER: I think you mean be under-stated.

DR. BUEHLER: Pardon? Or be understated, you are correct.

MR. SHANAHAN: Q. I am suggesting



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

to you whether they were deliberate or intentional that the profile of the person giving it would still be the same, more so if intentional mind you, but I am saying that your qualification there at the beginning of that paragraph doesn't change the three characteristics of the perpetrator that you set out there, first of all, and then my second question is going to be, doesn't that portrayal there fit both the nursing team and specifically Nurse Trayner.

A. If the initial phrase of that paragraph read "If the epidemic was the result of accidental acts" then I believe the sentence that begins with the word "The cause of..." suggesting that the perpetrator had enough clinical knowledge, et cetera, that sentence would not be particularly relevant.

Q. All right, I will leave it at that then.

One final one then. To your knowledge, is there any factor about population or a disease or a condition which would cause deaths that you know to occur predominantly between those hours, 12:00 and 6:00, and only when a certain nurse, Nurse



BB11

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

Trayner was on duty? Do you know of any other conditions or factors which would cause that coincidence of features?

A. We did not find a disease pattern that could be described by those events, you are correct.

Q. All right. That would have those coincidence of factors about time and nursing team and specifically one nurse?

A. Our investigation could not identify a disease that had those coincidence factors.

MR. SHANAHAN: All right, thank you very much.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you,

Mr. Shanahan. Mr. Strathy?

MR. STRATHY: Mr. Commissioner, do you mind if I address my questions from this location?

THE COMMISSIONER: No, that is fine. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. STRATHY:

Q. Ladies and gentlemen, my name is Strathy, I represent Nurse Trayner whom you may know as Nurse 401.



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
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Now, as you might expect, my client is quite interested in the things you have to say. She has read your report, she has some questions about your report, as I do, and I would like to address some questions to you about your report and I hope I won't repeat things that have already been asked of you; if I do, try and bear with me.

As I understand it, and perhaps I will start by addressing my questions to Dr. Buehler if I may, you basically started your enquiry in July through September of 1982, am I right on that?

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

- A. We began in September of 1982.
- Q. So, you were retained in approximately July but the investigation itself started in about September?
- A. The initial communication which eventually lead to our involvement I believe was in July.
- A. (Dr. Smith) July 29th I believe, July 30th.



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Q. But the actual work itself didn't start until the fall?

A . That is correct.

Q. And at the time you commenced your work would you agree with me it was well known certainly to all of you, and if any one of you disagree, please let me know, that the question of the association of these deaths with the nursing staff at the Hospital was something well known; is that fair?

A. We were well aware of the fact that a nurse had been arrested and charges laid.

Q. And did you know that a nurse indeed who was a member of this particular team had been chaged with four of these deaths?

A. Yes, we were aware of that.

Q. And were you also aware of the fact that my client, Mrs. Trayner, was the team leader on that particular team?

A. We learned that.

Q. Learned it I assume fairly soon after becoming involved in the matter; is that fair?

A. At some time. I don't recall

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
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(A	NSWERS	BY	DR.	BUEHLER)
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exactly when we learned that.

- Q. Would it have been at a relatively early stage?
 - A. I think so.
- Q. Certainly when you took up your investigation this whole question of association with nurses was something that was pretty hard to avoid, or hard to ignore; is that fair?
- A. As we stated, we at the outset did not necessarily plan to look at that.

 That was a decision that was made later on in the investigation.
- Q. Well, just to go back to my question. The fact of the association was presumably something pretty hard -- you couldn't put it out of your mind, could you?
 - A. That was --
- Q. It received a good deal of publicity?
- A. Yes, that is obvious, yes. There was certainly a great deal of publicity about that.
- Q. And certainly when you went into the investigation I would suggest that one of



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
(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

the things you had in mind to look at, obviously, was going to be association with personnel at the Hospital?

- A. Yes.
- Q. And more specifically, I suppose, association with nurses in the Hospital?
- A. That is not precise because we felt it was important to look at those Hospital personnel who had prolonged times on the ward on a 24-hour basis; namely, physicians and nurses. We felt it was extremely important to, as best we could, look at evidence relating both to physicians and nurses.
- Q. So when you went into this study then it was extremly important to you not just to focus on nurses?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. You wanted to look at the possibility that other personnel in the Hospital may have had an opportunity, let's call it that?

 Is that fair? Or association, let's call it --
 - A. Association is a better word.
 - Q. Is that the word you would

A. Yes.



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

Q. So that the question of association then from your point of view as epidemiologists going into this study was not to be confined to nurses. It should have been a broad spectrum of Hospital personnel presumably?

A. As it turned out we focused mainly on doctors and nurses, but that focus was made after other results and information were available.

Q. That was a decision, though, which was dictated by the practicalities of the situation; is that fair?

A. There were practicalities of the situation which dictated the amount of detail with which we could examine the presence or absence of physicians and nurses; however, there were other reasons why we focused on those two groups.

Q. Well, the practicalities that I was referring to was the practicality of availability of data. Is that fair?

A. Yes.

Q. All right.

Looking at it as scientists and as



CC5

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

epidemiologists I understand you are scientists and going in in the first instance ideally what you would like to have would be data about all the Hospital personnel who might have had an association with these deaths; is that fair?

A. Ideally in initially approaching the situation, yes.

Q. All right. So your evidence is as I understand it then, starting off you were not simply focusing on nurses; you were focusing on anybody who might have had an association at these times and was linked to the Hospital in some way, and as your investigation progressed, for reasons primarily of practicality as I understand it, you focused on nurses and doctors?

A. We focused on nurses and doctors, but that was not primarily a reason of practicality. If, for example, we had found that there was an outbreak that had occurred between noon and four in the afternoon we would have broadened our scope.

Q. All right. But even within those frameworks, the framework of the deaths occurring at night, there were other personnel in



CC6

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

the Hospital other than nurses and doctors. That is obvious?

- A. That is correct.
- Q. And you didn't focus on

them?

- A. That is correct, we --
- Q. All right.
- A. We looked at information relevant to others but not in nearly the amount of detail that we used to look at physicians and doctors.
- Q. And even in the nurses and doctors that you looked at it is fairly clear from your evidence in the past few days that you looked at only certain groups of nurses and only ceratin groups of doctors. You didn't look at all nurses even amongst the people that were on on nights?
- A. Well, for physicians we looked at those who -- initially for physicians we looked at the call schedule for the Cardiology Ward. Later for physicians the call schedule for the entire Hospital was examined. For nurses we looked at duty schedules for Wards 4A and 4B.
 - Q. All right. And that is what



CC7

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

I am referring to as a pretty limited class of nurses, the 4A and 4B nurses, because we know there were other nurses in the Hospital that you didn't look at.

- A. That is correct.
- Q. All right. And those were other nurses in the Hospital at night. Am I right on that?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. All right. And obviously the people that you looked at, the nurses and the doctors, even using the information you had, you looked at the people you expected to be there. Isn't that right?

Maybe my question should be rephrased. You don't know anything about people who may have been there who weren't expected to be there because you don't have data about that. Isn't that fair?

- A. Yes.
- Q. I hasten to add, and I want this to be clear, if any of your colleagues disagree with you -- I hear the calls from the wings or the audibles from the sideline -- if they do disagree



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

with you please advise me or advise the Commissioner on any one of my questions.

All right then. To go back to the information that you had when you started up this investigation, I take it it was also very clear to you (it was notorious in fact) that digoxin — it was something about digoxin that was giving people concern. Is that fair?

- A. Yes, that is fair.
- Q. And you knew digoxin had been raised at the preliminary inquiry as the alleged medium that contributed to the deaths of these children. Is that right?
- A. Yes. We were aware that that issue had been raised.
- Q. And is it pretty fair to say that your investigation really from the outset, just looking at your terms of reference, assumed that digoxin was at least the chemical agent. Is that accurate?
- A. One of the questions that we specifically asked -- first let me back up.

By very virtue of the issue of post mortem digoxin levels in exhumed tissues and



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

different types of other post mortem tissues and pre-mortem tissues, we were clearly in terms of our reference aware that there was a great deal of controversy surrounding the interpretation of that information. That was the reason we sought the assistance of Dr. Kauffman.

One of the questions we asked Dr.

Kauffman to address -- clearly Dr. Kauffman's
review was focused on digoxin, but we did ask him
to address the issue of was his impression that there
were other medications given which may have contributed to death and/or modified the response to
digoxin.

- Q. All right. I simply was trying to get at the point, and perhaps I am belabouring it, that digoxin was pretty much in the forefront of your minds when you went into this investigation?
 - A. That is correct.
- Q. Now I mentioned to you that for reasons which you can well understand my client is vitally interested in your report, and my question to you is whether at any point any one of you or your team ever went to speak to my client during the



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

course of your investigation?

A. None of the members of this team has ever spoken to your client.

Q. Were you under any instruction from anyone not to speak to my client?

A. No.

Q. You never asked her or me if you could speak to her, did you?

A. That is correct.

Q. So you obviously did not put any questions to her about anything concerning her procedures as team leader which might have contributed to these deaths?

A. That is correct.

Q. Or anything that she might have known about the procedures of any other person that might have contributed to these deaths?

A. That is correct.

Q. Did you in the course of your investigation look at any of the many, many statements that my client has given to the Metropolitan Toronto Police in this matter since the inception of the investigation?

A. We have read parts of the testimony that was given in the legal proceedings



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

following Nurse Nelles' arrest, but again I think --

Well, let --Q.

-- I think it is extremely important to emphasize as we have before that we were not criminal investigators.

All right. I think that is a fair observation, and you have made that before.

You don't see your function as either detectives or policemen, do you? Is that fair?

- A. We are certainly not policemen.
- Q. You may be detectives, but in a world that perhaps Quincy occupies, or maybe Quincy is a bad example.


Α. I have never seen that TV show.

Q. You are scientists, not detectives; is that fair?

A. We try to approach this scientifically; correct.

And you obviously do not 0. approach it as prosecutors either, do you?

- Α. That is absolutely correct.
- And you wouldn't want to be Q.



CC12

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

understood publicly to be either policemen or prosecutors?

A. We wouldn't want our information to be misused.

Q. All right. I will come to that in a moment, but just dealing with my initial question: You mentioned you read some of the evidence at the preliminary inquiry.

My question was a bit more specific, and that was, did you ever read any of the many statements, and there are well in excess of fifteen
statements my client has given to the Metropolitan
Toronto Police in this matter since its inception
in the course of the investigation, in the course of
the preliminary inquiry and subsequent to the
preliminary inquiry, and my question is whether you
have read any of those?

A. The only information that we would have read would have been in the transcripts.

Q. Well, dealing with the transcripts were you -- I take it you were aware that my client gave evidence at the preliminary inquiry for some five or six days? Were you aware of that?

A. I was not -- I was aware that



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

your client gave testimony at the preliminary hearing.

I had no idea how long she was on the witness stand.

Q. All right. Did you read her evidence, do you recall?

A. I read quite -- I read some of that testimony. Actually the testimony that I read in greatest detail dealt with evidence presented concerning levels of digoxin, and I may have read some of your client's testimony but I don't remember in particular.

Q. How about your colleagues?

Do they recall reading my client's evidence?

A. (Dr. Smith) I remember reading some of it. I don't remember specifically anything that I read at that time.

Q. Dr. Wallace?

A. (Dr. Wallace) Yes, I have read some of her testimony.

 Ω_{\bullet} Do you recall if you read all of it or not?

A. (Dr. Wallace) No, I have not read all of it.

Q. All right. Were you aware,
Dr. Buehler, that as of July 1980, my client had been



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

at The Hospital for Sick Children for two and a half years?

Α. I don't remember if I had been told how long she was there or not.

> Q. Dr. Smith?

Α. (Dr. Smith) I was not aware that she had been there for any period of time.

0. Let me ask you, Dr. Buehler, on the subject of epidemiologists and what they do, what you people do when you are looking at an epidemic.

To take a typical epidemic situation would one of the things that you would look for in trying to pinpoint a cause of an epidemic be something new in the environment?

> Α. Yes.

Can you give us an example Q. of the sort of thing that you would look for?

For example, if you were A. investigating an outbreak of infectious disease in a hospital you might look to see whether or not there were changes in the way that disease is diagnosed.

> Changes in the way the disease Q.



CC15

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

is diagnosed? Would you also look perhaps for some new thing that has been brought into that hospital environment?

A. I think you could answer that question by looking at the steps that we took in approaching this.

We did attempt to get background information on the Hospital in terms of the types of procedure, et cetera, and we in the initial interviews that we had with Hospital personnel asked those kinds of questions.



DD M/PS (ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

Q. Looking for something new?


A. We asked about, for example, were there any changes in the way -- we were aware for example that there was a new cardiology ward three months before this happened. We asked about, you know, were there more surgical procedures that lasted say longer than four hours; or was there more occupancy, etc., so we asked about that type of background information. I cannot say that we can conclusively prove that nothing new happened at the hospital in July, 1980. One of the things that does happen every July is a new set of doctors come on the ward.

Q. I'm sorry, a new set of doctors?

A. Yes, the academic year is usually July to July, so that is when physicians rotate their annual schedules.

Q. Well, the purpose of all these questions that you were asking, and the ones that you have just identified, that was for the purpose of seeing if there was some change at the outset of the epidemic period, is that right?

A. Yes, that is correct. Was



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

TORONTO, ONTARIO

there a change that occurred in parallel, and we attempted to use the available data to address that issue.

Q. That is something that I am interested in, because I have been unable to see, I see speculation in your report, maybe that is as far as it has got, as to why it was that this epidemic, as you call it, started in July of 1980, that is something that I don't understand.

Let me ask you, did you look at what was new in July of 1980, or the period of time, let's say, shortly before that, in terms of specific personnel?

- A. No, we did not; in terms of nursing personnel are you asking?
- Let's start with nursing 0. personnel. Did you look at the question of whether there were any new nursing personnel whose presence on the ward coincided with the time of the so-called epidemic?
- No, I don't believe that we Α. did that.
- 0. Did you look at the presence of any non-nursing personnel, let's say, doctors,



Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kusiak cr. ex. (Strathy)

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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

to see whether that coincided.

- We know from the physician call schedule that they change approximately once every four to six weeks; then we also know that physicians change for their academic year.
- Their new year starts in Q. July?
 - A. Yes.
- So you know that. What about other personnel?
- We did not inquire about changes, new personnel in other categories.
- 0. Would it not have been of interest to you for you to know as epidemiologists whether there was a new nursing personnel that were on the ward at the commencement of the period?
- The types of changes we were A. interested in were more dealing with routines for patient care, and indicators of patient care. Again, I think you are beginning to potentially push us to the limit of what you might describe as the boundary, or where epidemiology may end and other types of investigations may begin.
 - So are you suggesting that this



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

question of what new personnel appeared on that ward in July of 1980 may be an interesting question for a detective, but not for an epidemiologist, is that what you are saying?

Smith, Buehler

Wallace, Kusiak cr. ex. (Strathy)

- A. That was not a question that we asked.
- Q. All right. Are you suggesting it might be a germane question if one were trying to find an explanation for the epidemic?
- I probably should not try to recommend to others how they conduct their investigation.
- 0. In any event, we know it is not something you did.
 - That is correct. A.
- Q. Well, now, one of the things that you mentioned you did in your report, and I am not sure that I have the page reference, but I recall that you asked when you were dealing with the hospital personnel, you asked for a list from the physicians, I believe, of any residents, perhaps it is fellows who had experienced difficulties during their period at the hospital; do you recall that in your report?



(ANSWERS BY DR. WALLACE:)

A. (DR. WALLACE) That is contained on page 20 of the report, yes.

Q. Yes, thank you. It is in the first paragraph of page 20 and it says:

"In addition, the Director of
Medical Education was asked to provide
a list of house staff physicians
who had encountered problems during
their training years, and the schedules
of these individuals was scrutinized."

I take it then that you did have a list of house staff physicians who had encountered problems, is that right?

A. We didn't have a list. This was a verbal communication to myself from Sister

Kenny, who is with the Medical Education Department.

Q. What did you mean by:

"...problems during their training period."

What were you talking about there?

A. When it was decided to look at nursing and physician schedules in detail, and we found data for the physician schedules to be inaccurate and incomplete, I went and I



(ANSWERS BY DR. WALLACE:)

discussed the whole matter with Sister Kenn who is responsible for drawing up many of these schedules. At the time I asked her if there had been individuals in the resident staff who had experienced difficulties of any sort in the time they were employed at the Hospital.

Q. Now just dealing with your particulars, would you agree with me that when you used the word "association", and in particular when you used the word "association" in your report, you are not talking about cause, is that fair?

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

- A. That is correct.
- Q. Is that a fairly fundamental tenet of epidemiology, that association is not cause?
 - A. Yes, that is correct.
- Q. Your colleagues are nodding their heads, I would think that is sort of basic first year epidemiology, is that true?
 - A. That is correct.
- Q. And in your report, is it fair to say that you do not purport, when you talk of



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

associations, to be talking of cause, is that so?

A. That is correct. There is one place in the report where we use the word "cause" and I said yesterday that was an unfortunate choice of words.

Q. So in terms of people looking at your report, and hearing your evidence, would it be fair to say that you would caution strongly about someone equating association with cause, you would caution against that?

A. Yes.

Q. And you would certainly not want to be interpreted by anybody to be suggesting that association in the case of your lists can, should or ought to be linked with cause, is that fair?

A. In the report there is a section where we did speculate. I think it is not unusual in investigations where there is incomplete data to offer speculation, but clearly we would not want anyone to conclude that because we observed an association between the presence of a particular individual and deaths, we would not want anyone to conclude that we say there is a causal



Smith, Buehler, Wallace, Kusiak cr. ex. (Strathy)

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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:) relationship.

Q. And as you said when Mr. Shanahan, who was the previous counsel, when he was asking you questions I think you recognized that there is a danger that the sort of information contained in your report may be misused by people who do not appreciate the limitations of what you have said in your report, is that fair?

A. It is certainly possible that the information in our report could be misused by someone.

Q. And certainly as a scientist, obviously you would not want it to be misused, and you would want to have people recognize the limitations which you put on it.

A. I believe that in our report we would not want people to overstate our findings, or understate our findings as the Commissioner has added.

THE COMMISSIONER: I think overstate is probably right there. Would this be a good time?

MR. STRATHY: Yes, it would, Mr.

Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right, we will take 15 minutes.

---Short recess.



BM/ak

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--- Upon resuming.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr. Strathy.

MR. STRATHY: Q. Yes. I wonder if you would turn to Tab 2 of your report, which is entitled, at least in the copy that I have Nurses Code.

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

A. May we have another copy. We are working from original versions. This coding book was collated separately.

Q. Now, what I would like to understand is who was included or who was given a code number?

(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

A. Anyone who was on duty at any time during the epidemic period.

Q. On duty?

A. On duty on Wards 4A or 4B and appeared in our data sources was given a code number.

Q. So, the people we look at on these four pages are 4A or 4B nurses.

A. They are nurses who worked on 4A or 4B. They are not what we have referred to as 4A/B nurses which would be the teams.



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(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

Q. All right. They may include then people who, although not regularly assigned to Ward 4A and 4B, worked on occasion in those wards during the epidemic period.

- A. Correct.
- Now then I take it they do not include the non-4A, 4B nursing personnel who worked on other floors but did not, at least as far as you could tell, come to 4A and 4B during the period?
 - That is correct. Α.
- Q. In other words, there may have been other nurses working in the Hospital for Sick Children, in fact I am sure there were other nurses working in the Hospital for Sick Children during the epidemic period assigned to other floors who, as far as you could tell, never did come to 4A and 4B.
- Α. That is correct. If the name was not listed in our data sources which we described earlier their names would not have been coded and they would not appear on this list.
- That is not to say of course Q. that they did not come to 4A and 4B at any time or



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(ANSWERS	BY	DR.	SMITH)
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times during the epidemic period, is that right?

A. Do you mean to visit or to

work?

Q. Well, let's say to visit.

Let's go back to your data sources. As I understand it it was the 4A, 4B schedule book, workbook.

A. The schedule book and the payroll sheets.

Q. So, the people that as far as you know were on 4A and 4B were people who were slotted there by the Hospital.

A. That is correct, officially slotted there.

Q. But you cannot rule out the possibility that some nurse assigned to another floor came on the ward to visit at any time or times during the epidemic period?

A. Absolutely, yes.

Q. And you didn't even look at the data - well, there was no data on that, so, you couldn't look at it?

A. There were no data to examine,

no.

Q. Well, I am interested in the



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(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

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TORONTO, ONTARIO

nurse supervisor or the supervising nurse. the subject was raised with you yesterday but I would like to pursue it a little bit further. Am I right that the nurse supervisors are not listed on this four page list?

I'm not just sure if they are here on this list or not.

A. If for example the nurse supervisor appeared on the payroll sheet as being temporarily assigned to the ward it is possible that a nurse supervisor would appear on our log if such an event occurred. But you are correct in stating that we did not include in the calender per se the nurse supervisors.

All right. So, this calendar that was prepared by Nurse Shilton, I believe her name was.

(ANSWERS BY DR. SMTIH)

- A. Yes.
- Q. Did not inlcude the nurse

supervisors?

Α. Not unless they were specifically assigned to the ward and listed in




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ANSWERS	BY	DR.	SMITH)
our data	SOI	urce	s.

- Q. Well, as I understand it the nurse supervisors were not the sort of people that were specifically assigned to 4A and 4B, isn't that right?
- A. That is my understanding as well, yes.
- Q. So that there were these nurse supervisors who were, as a matter of routine, in the Hospital at night who are not part of the Shilton study and therefore you have no mapping of their movements, is that right?
- A. We have no mapping of their movements.
- Q. Do you know incidentally how many nurse supervisors were on each night?
 - A. I don't.
- Q. My information is that there were two.

(ANSWERS BY DR. WALLACE)

- A. It was my understanding that there were three but I may be in error.
- Q. Do you know the source of your understanding; in other words, how do you know there were three or can you help us there?



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(ANSWERS BY DR. WALLACE)

A. I can't remember the source of that information.

Q. And is it your understanding, Dr. Wallace, that these nurse supervisors were on in effect throughout the nighttime period?

A. Yes, I believe that to be

Q. Do you know when they came on

A. No, I'm sorry I do not.

Q. Well, the Commissioner asked you, Dr. Buehler, yesterday at page 559 of the transcript in the course of your questioning by Ms. Symes about your, his words were:

"THE COMMISSIONER: Would it not concern you if a supervising nurse was, or by coincidence happen to be on duty at the time of all of these deaths?"

And you said:

"DR. BUEHLER: Yes, that would be a concern."

Do you recall your evidence on that?

A. (Dr. Buehler) I am not



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

reading from the transcript right now.

- Q. That is page 559 about the middle of the page.
 - A. Yes, that is correct.
 - Q. But then you went on to say:

"DR. BUEHLER: We did not address the issue of the supervising nurses."

Do you see that?

- A. That is correct, we did not have a 24-hour calendar for the supervising nurses.
- Q. So, it is not something on which you have data?
 - A. That is correct.
- Q. But you would agree with me I think that if one was doing a complete sort of association study that is data that you would ideally like to have.
- A. There is a great deal of data that if we were going to be 100 per cent complete would be ideal to have. In think we emphasized before that we focused on doctors and nurses who were on duty for prolonged periods on the ward.
 - Q. Well, let me put it to you



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

TORONTO, ONTARIO

this way. If you were to be satisfied that one of the nursing supervisors was present on 4A and 4B for, let me use the word, a significant number of the Category A and Category B deaths, would that be something of interest to you?

I think that it would be Α. important to look at that in terms of the relative risk estimates, as we have done with the other nurses if we are going to look at it in that way.

Well, let me be a bit more Q. specific. Supposing you were to ascertain that a particular nurse supervisor, and let's just take one for the moment, but a particular nurse supervisor was present on the ward for let us say 20 of 28 deaths, would that be a matter of interest to you?

I think you would need to Α. compare that to the other nurse supervisors.

All right. Let's suppose that there were two nurse supervisors who were present on the ward for 20 of 28 deaths, would that be of interest to you?

One thing we did not do in A. our analysis of the data was to look at combinations of two or more personnel, that was not an analysis



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER) that we performed.

TORONTO, ONTARIO

Well, I understand the limitations of where you went in terms of pairing personnel.

> A. Yes.


But I am just putting to this hypothetical situation of a nurse supervisor ---

Excuse me, Mr. Commissioner, just for the information of counsel who perhaps may not be used to our procedures I think it is best that if counsel has an objection that it be raised rather than communicating to the witness.

MS. NESLUND: Yes, I have an objection to him propounding hypotheticals to Dr. Buehler.

THE COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry, what was that? Would you not be interested? That is not quite a hypothetical, it is the manner in which they conduct their investigation.

MS. NESLUND: He got into an area, he started an area that was a gray area and then made the hypothetical, actually, formulated a pretty strong hypothetical. It would call on Dr. Buehler to actually get into an area that would



be beyond the scope of his expertise.

an epidemiologist. The question is, would he as an epidemiologist be interested if the facts that he found by examination that a supervisor was on the scene, at least in the wards at the time of the deaths, we will say 20 out of the 28 suspicious deaths. That is the question and I would have thought that that is in his field of expertise because he is an epidemiologist. No?

MS. NESLUND: My interpretation of the rules would be contrary to that. The rules are that he is not permitted to give expertise testimony in that area. We have discussed this before that it does get into many gray areas. I think probably Dr. Buehler handled the question just fine but perhaps my feeling would be that Counsel just avoid when possible getting into -- you see, it puts Dr. Buehler into the position, not that we want to be disruptive, it puts him in the position of violating the Public Health Service rules.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I'm sure you are much more familiar with the rules than I am but he is here as an expert epidemiologist and I



to, that expertise. The minute of course they start saying if a child displayed these symptoms would he appear to be suffering from digoxin toxicity or something like that then that is obviously a breach of the rules that I can understand but I don't understand...

MS. NESLUND: The rules actually

thought that that was what his question was leading

ms. NESLUND: The rules actually get into areas of epidemiology as well that he cannot speak as an expert in this proceeding from that field. I realize many of the questions - we realize it is hard to draw the line and I am well aware of that and in most instances we have just ---

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, perhaps we can solve this problem by Dr. Smith or Dr. Wallace coming to the rescue under these circumstances.

MS. NESLUND: I think that would be the easiest.

THE COMMISSIONER: We don't want you to go home and get into trouble with the powers that be, whereas, I can perhaps protect Dr. Smith and Dr. Wallace.

MR. STRATHY: Maybe Dr. Buehler can hold up one hand if he agrees and two hands if he disagrees.



Q. Well, all right, Dr. Smith, let me put the question to you and if you would prefer that Dr. Wallace answer please let me know. But let me go back and rephrase my question. Let me start with a question that puts to you that a nursing supervisor was present in the Hospital and was associated with the deaths to the extent of 28 of 28 Category A and Category B deaths.

(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

A. 28 of 28?

Q. Yes, let me put that to you to start with. Now, I take it that that would be a matter of ---

MS. SYMES: Excuse me, I presume that this is a hypothetical if?

MR. STRATHY: Well, I haven't heard any evidence yet but I think I am entitled to put hypotheticals.

MS. SYMES: No, it is just that the statement didn't include an "if".

MR. STRATHY: Well, I thought it did.

well, he started saying "Let us assume", which is much the same.

MS. SYMES: All right.



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	MR. STRATHY:	Q. My question
then; Doctor,	is whether that	would be a matter of
significant in	terest to you as	s an epidemiologist?
(ANSWERS BY DR	. SMITH)	

A. The simultaneous occurrence of a presence of a supervisor and one of the 28 deaths.

Q. No, 28.

A. And 28 of the 28 deaths would be of some concern. However, the calculations with which we would compare that particular nurse would have to be done in a similar fashion to the calculations which were done for the presence or absence and to get at the particular association of each individual nurse and then we would have to compare those.

Q. Of course. But assuming that the methodology adopted was the same and that the methodology adopted didn't differ at all from the methodology you have previously applied. I am sure you would agree with me that that would be of interest to you in this particular case.

A. That would be of some interest, yes. An additional situation would be that the actual time on the ward would have to be taken into



(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

consideration for that supervisor.

- Q. Well, except for this fact that for the supervisor you wouldn't necessarily know when she would be in 4A and 4B because, as I understand it, they are the type of people who might come up at any time. Isn't that so?
- A. I understand that they circulate through the Hospital, yes.
- Q. Exactly. So, for a supervisor you may have no precise record as to when the supervisor was or was not on 4A and 4B?
- A. We would not have a precise record.
- Q. But I suggest to you that the very presence of that individual within the Hospital and the association between that individual's presence and the particular deaths would be a matter of interest to you?



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It would be of interest.

Q. All right. And that again -one hand or two hands, doctor?

THE COMMISSIONER: The reason I mentioned it yesterday, it seems to me relatively easy at least to determine whether a particular supervisor was on duty, not whether she was on Ward 4A and 4B, on duty in the Hospital on the night of all of the deaths.

That sort of thing I think could have been determined, could it not? I mean there must be records of what supervisors are on duty, and I take it you did this for the doctors and for Ward 4A?

DR. SMITH: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: And doctors who are on duty in Ward 4A generally I suppose don't go -- at least junior doctors don't go moving to another ward?

DR. SMITH: No, they just attend wards to which they are assigned.

THE COMMISSIONER: And the nurses just attend on the ward to which they are assigned? DR. SMITH: That is right.

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THE COMMISSIONER: But the supervisors have the whole Hospital, and there may be
perhaps less suspicion -- I don't know if that is
true or not, but at any rate the opportunity to be
associated, if not the association, would be there for..
I would suspect that information could still be
obtained. I may be wrong.

DR. SMITH: Yes, I would think that would be obtainable.

MR. STRATHY: Well, that is information I would like to ask for, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I don't know how -- is there some way, Mr. Roland? Were you listening to this?

MR. ROLAND: Well, I don't have it

THE COMMISSIONER: No, no, no.

MS. CRONK: The very first time!

MR. ROLAND: We will see what we can

do.

with me.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you. But I don't think we need to put you to any problem unless it turns out that there is a supervisor --



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MR. STRATHY: Well, I would like to pursue the matter at least briefly, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.

MR. STRATHY: Q. And ask a further question, Dr. Smith, and let's say that again using the same methodology that you used with respect to the other nurses you were to find that a particular nursing supervisor was associated with let us say between 20 and 25 of these deaths. Would you agree that that would also be of interest to you as an epidemiologist?

(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

A. It would be of interest, but I repeat the actual calculations would have to be performed to put the rate -- to put the relative risk of that individual into some perspective.

- Q. All right. But --
- A. (Mr. Kusiak) Can I add --
- Q. I will give you a moment,

Dr. Kusiak --

- A. (Mr. Kusiak) Mr. Kusiak.
- Q. Mr. Kusiak.

But, Dr. Smith, assuming that you have the information and assuming that you do the calculations you would agree the results may be of interest to you?



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(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

A. They could be of interest.

THE COMMISSIONER: I take it there would be some circumstances when you wouldn't bother, and perhaps I am addressing Mr. Kusiak for this, but presumably if there were no supervisor who was on duty for more than two or three of the deaths it wouldn't be worthwhile even bothering with the calculations?

DR. SMITH: One could go through a process of elimination and not actually have to do all of the work.

MR. KUSIAK: The only comment I would offer is that the interpretation would be slightly different since the data would not be the same as the nursing schedule in the sense that the location for the nursing superivsor wouldn't necessarily be 4A/4B.

MR. STRATHY: Q. Yes, but the location itself would be The Hospital for Sick Children?

(ANSWERS BY MR. KUSIAK)

A. Yes, that is true, so there is a slight difference between that and the nursing schedule.



(ANSWERS BY MR. KUSIAK)

Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kusiak cr.ex. (Strathy)

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Q. But again while that does not in and of itself indicate that that person was actually present on 4A and 4B, it does indicate that at least there was the opportunity for that person to be present?

A. Quite true.

Q. And again perhaps I can go back to Dr. Buehler.

Now would you agree with me if we are able to obtain this information concerning nursing supervisors and if it does establish an important, let us say, significant relative risk concerning the nursing supervisor's presence and the particular deaths, would you agree that its absence may be a significant shortcoming in your report; not necessarily that it is your fault but that it is a significant shortcoming?

(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

A. I think we have made it clear that we didn't look at all the people who were in the Hospital and --

THE COMMISSIONER: I wonder if I could just suggest that Mr. Strathy put his question a little more politely by saying that its addition



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER)

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might improve your report.

MR. STRATHY: All right. That is a fair way. I will put it that way.

Would you agree in the case Q. of these nursing supervisors the addition of that information might improve your report?

The addition of that information would certainly increase the comprehensiveness of our report.

And indeed I have picked the nursing supervisors, and we will deal with the evidence on that point, but you will acknowledge that there may well be other individuals in the Hospital for whom you are not able to give us associations simply because you had not the data?

That is correct, and I believe that is something that we make clear in our report.

All right. Let me take you to a different subject, and I would like to ask you about epidemiological investigations.

I have in front of me Exhibit 325 which is the single page. Is this, Dr. Smith, is this your outline? (ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

> Yes, that is a brief outline --Α.



(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

Q. All right.

A. -- that I prepared for Mr.

Smith, Buehler

Wallace; Kusiak cr.ex. (Strathy)

Lamek.

Q. Just looking at the middle of the page you indicate Step No. 1 is define the problem (case definition), and am I correct if we are going back to our first year epidemiology course that that is the starting point for virtually every epidemiological investigation, to define the case?

A. That is correct. That is a first point, and we do make a reference in the report to the fact that we could not formulate a case definition strictly on toxicological grounds.

Q. All right. So that in view of the nature of the problem that presented itself you were not able to define the case perhaps in traditional epidemiological terms; is that fair?

A. We could not give an exact definition, case definition.

Q. All right. And indeed the definition of the case itself appears to fluctuate depending on whether you are dealing with Category A, Category B or Category C. Is that fair?

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(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

as such.

A. Those are not case definitions

- Q. All right. What are they?
- A. Well, I would define them as just particular categories that were put together for the purpose of grouping deaths in the periods which we were studying.
 - Q. Let me go about this --
- A. One could group them in many ways, and those were arbitrary categories in which we chose to group them.
- Q. Let me go about this a different way to make sure I understand it.

When you talk about defining the case, and let me pick an example, Dr. Smith, I believe you have had experience with lung cancer; part of your research is in lung cancer. Is that right?

- A. Part of my research is, which I listed in my vitae, developing a proposal for case control study of lung cancer. That is not complete.
- Q. Dealing with that in a typical epidemiological investigation you would start



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(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

with a definition of the case in terms of lung cancer; is that fair?

A. You would start with that, yes, and you would make some specific criteria to what constitutes a case of lung cancer.

Q. And if Dr. Buehler was looking at gastroenteritis or conjunctivitis he would do the same thing.

Am I right that you would define what it is you are talking about in medical terms?

A. (Dr. Buehler) I have done that in outbreaks of gastroenteritis and conjunctivities.

Q. Okay. That is why I used those examples.

Now in this particular case, though, as I understand it, Dr. Smith, you weren't able to define a case in those precise terms because the cases themselves were not capable of being defined in strictly medical or toxicological terms. Is that fair?

A. That is correct. We could not define a single case. We had to really go at the whole population and see how that could be broken





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(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

A. (Dr. Buehler) Could I interject there? I believe you are addressing the comparison of epidemic period deaths to deaths in other periods.

Q. Well, actually to tell you the truth I am not, so I think it would be best if you not anticipate where I am going because I am not going in that direction unless you want to make some comment about the subject.

- A. (Dr. Buehler) Excuse me.
- Q. Okay. Now then, Dr. Smith, carrying on, after the definition of the case do you then go out and look at the cases? Is that what you do in epidemiology? You say, all right, who is it out there that has got lung cancer in the community you are looking at?

A. Yes. Well, we define -- yes, if we have a case definition we would look for that case definition in the population.

Q. All right. You define what it is you are looking for.

- A. That is right.
- Q. You look at the population



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(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

and you say who fits within this case definition; is that right?

- A. That is correct.
- Q. And is there a stage there once you start looking at the population in which you verify your diagnosis? You satisfy yourself that indeed this is a case of gastroenteritis and not appendicitis?
- A. You try to comply with the criteria which were set out to define the case.
- Q. And you make sure that the, call them specimens or subjects that you are looking at are in fact true cases?
 - A. That is called ascertainment.
- Q. Ascertainment. So can we take a step, define the case, verify diagnosis, ascertainment. Is that three steps or just two steps?
- A. It is really two steps. You ascertain that the criteria have been properly met and that that is indeed a case.
- Q. So that what you are looking at is in fact the thing that you want to investigate and not some other thing?



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(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)

A. That is correct.

Q. And then once you have done that, once you are satisfied that you have got true cases, that is the point at which you start moving on determining if there is an epidemic and looking for the type of associations that you have talked about already?

- A. Yes.
- Q. Is that right?
- A. That is correct.
- Q. And presumably the whole process of this verifying the diagnosis and the ascertainment is to make sure that you are not leading to false associations by including untrue cases in your sample; is that fair?

A. Yes, it is important to include true cases in the sample or to define -- yes, you are correct.

Q. Because if you presumably include in your sample things that are not true cases you may as a result have false associations as a result; is that fair?

A. You may have an inappropriately higher incidence of so-called cases.

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(ANSWERS E	3Y .	MR.	KUS	IAK)
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0. And indeed you may also have false associations because you are not dealing with gastroenteritis; you are dealing with gastroenteritis and appendicitis so the associations you get may be misleading?

A. You are suggesting that the number of cases would be contaminated with people who are in fact not cases.

> 0. Thank you. That is --

And the effect of that would then be to somehow make it more difficult to see association between the case that you are actually looking for and the factors that cause that case.

A.

Yes. It may not only make it more difficult but the associations that you get may be inaccurate.

They would be Α. inaccurate and also tend to be less strong.

For instance, if I had 100 cases of gastroenteritis and somehow contaminated with that were 500 other cases then the 500 other cases would be unrelated entirely to the risk factors that caused the gastroenteritis and therefore statistics would



(ANSWERS BY MR. KUSIAK)

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probably come up with a risk factor somewhat lower.

Q. Well --

A. You wouldn't be able to detect the risk factor that is associated with the cases you defined.

Q. All right. But let me go back. I am not sure I remember your words, but, yes, I am suggesting that the result of including things that are not true cases in a sample might result in a -- well, incorrect results.

A. Yes, and one could even go a little bit further and say that the incorrect result, you know, if one did the usual statistical test associations, that the associations would not be as strong as they really should be.

Q. Well, except that there may be associations between your not true or untrue cases and also with your true cases, and they may be common associations, so there may be as strong or stronger associations?

A. If I found in an epidemiological study that one factor was both related to
one case, a case and a non-case, I would reject that
as being an agent or variable that could possibly



(ANSWERS BY MR. KUSIAK)

be causative in the outcome that we were interested in.

- Q. Possibly, but not necessarily because we have already heard that an association is not cause?
- A. That is true, and of course I deal in probabilities so I can say nothing with absolute truth.
- Q. All right. But my point is this, and I hope I am right in understanding at least what it is that you are saying is that the classical starting point is to make sure that you are in fact dealing with apples and not apples mixed with pears? Is that a crude way of putting it?

 (ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH)
- A. I am not sure that I understand that analogy.
- Q. Well then let me put it this way: That you are in fact looking at the disease you are interested in and not the disease mixed with some other disease?
- A. Yes, it would be ideal to have a case definition and individuals who met that case definition used only in the description of an incidence curve, an epidemic curve. That would be ideal.



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(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH:)

Q. And to be clear, then, the case that you used in this investigation was not a case that said you would look at babies who died due to digoxin toxicity, that was not the case, was it?

A. (DR. SMITH) We did not start out that way. We started out defining the epidemic curve, because we did not have a specific toxicologically associated case definition. We started out by defining death as that end point that we would look at.

Q. All right. In effect, you looked at death on Wards 4A and 4B in the Hospital for Sick Children during the period July, 1980 to March, 1981.

A. We looked at deaths for the period preceding that and the period after that, in other wards as well as are described in the report. I will give you one of the graphs where we actually looked at death.

- Q. All right.
- A. We defined our end point from the description of those graphs as mortality.
- Q. Can you give us that graph, please?



(ANSWERS BY	DR.	SMITH:)
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- A. Mortality rates, that would be Figure No.4, and Figure No. 3 would be 4A/B deaths, these are the mortality rates.
- Q. Well, to be clear, you defined your case simply in terms of the end result, is that right, in terms of deaths?
 - A. That is correct.
- Q. And you did not define your case in terms of deaths due to digoxin administration?
 - A. We could not do that.
- A. (DR. BUEHLER) May I ask which part of the study you are asking about, because it is important to speak to it.
- Q. Ultimately we get down to the A, B, C categories, and we know how these are defined, and even those are not defined in terms of babies who died of digoxin intoxication, is that correct?
- A. (DR. SMITH) They are defined as they are described in the broad categories that are described.
 - Q. Let's go to those, then.
 - A. On page --



Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kusiak cr. ex. (Strathy)

(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH:)

Q. Page 13.

A. Page 13.

Q. All right. What your

consultants were attempting to do, as I understand it, at least, was not say this is a baby that died of digoxin intoxication; they were attempting to weight each child on a variety of scales, some of which may have been related to digoxin intoxication, but were not necessarily definitive of digoxin intoxication, is that correct?

- A. Could you repeat that question?
- Q. As I understand what your consultants did, they were attempting to rate each child on a scale, or in accordance with certain criteria, some of which had to do with digoxin intoxication, but they were not purporting to say that any particular child died as a result of digoxin intoxication.
- A. I would have to rreview the actual testimony that Dr. Kauffman gave to be able to answer that, I am not quite sure.
- Q. Let us leave aside Dr. Kauffman's testimony and simply look at the categories which you have used in your report, based on the information which you got from your consultants. As I



Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kusiak cr. ex. (Strathy)

(ANSWERS BY DR. SMITH:)

understand it, none of those consultants in what they were doing was trying to say that a child did or did not die of digoxin intoxication.

For example, the cardiologist was asked whether the death was expected or unexpected and whether it was consistent with the child's clinical status, that in itself does not address the question of digoxin intoxication.

- A. That is correct.
- A. (DR. BUEHLER) That is correct.
- Q. So that when these lists were being put together they are not lists of children who died of digoxin intoxication, is that correct?

 (ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)
- A. They are children who had those particular scores by the consultants.
- Q. But within any of those categories, and let us simply take the category A deaths, there well may have been children whose deaths were natural and unrelated to digoxin intoxication, notwithstanding that they were scored as they were? If that is a medical question that you would rather not answer, I can understand that.
 - A. I think it would be best if



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(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

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Dr. Nadas could speak for himself on that issue. I understand Dr. Nadas will not be providing testimony at this proceeding.

- Q. That is what I was concerned about.
- Α. Those are the scores that Dr. Nadas gave us as his clinical impressions based on the pattern of the child's death, as a clinician, did he think that the timing was unexpected, or that the pattern suggested digoxin toxicity?
- But he was not purporting to Q. say, as I understand it, and as I understand your report, that a particular child's death was caused by digoxin intoxication.
 - That is quite correct. Α.
- Q. So are you prepared to take that step and agree with me that any particular child, let us say category A, may or may not have died of digoxin intoxication, that is really a matter for the experts, I suppose.
- This is a very important point. Nowhere in the report did we say that a child died because of digoxin intoxication. We merely give levels of probability based on, particularly on Dr.



(ANSWERS BY DR. BUEHLER:)

Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kusiak cr. ex. (Strathy)

appropriate.

sir.

Kauffman's scores, his 1 to 5 scale, was based on Dr. Nadas' clinical impression. Or, as you might have noticed, based on pathologist's scores as well. We did not only report, say, that this child died because of digoxin intoxication.

Q. And to go back to what we were discussing earlier, I take it you would not want it to be understood that any of the children, let us just stop at the category A deaths, you would not want it to be understood that any or all of those children necessarily died as a result of digoxin intoxication, because that is not what that addresses.


A. Based on our report we would not want anyone to conclude that we said that some-body died because of digoxin intoxication.

Q. Is that fair from all the witnesses?

A. (DR. SMITH) I would agree with that.

THE COMMISSIONER: Whenever it is

MR. STRATHY: This would be convenient,



THE COMMISSIONER: Could you give us some indication?

MR. STRATHY: Well, I think I can say I will be, I might well take us to the break tomorrow morning, I don't want to make that absolute promise, but I think I am good for another half hour to an hour, anyway, and quite possibly a bit more. If that is any help, but I am sorry I cannot be more specific.

THE COMMISSIONER: Quite possibly a bit more, did you say?

MR. STRATHY: I doubt that I will go beyond the break.

THE COMMISSIONER: No.

That's fine, no, no, you take whatever time you want. It is just about the scheduling.

MS. CRONK: For the benefit of other counsel, Mr.Commissioner, we will make suitable arrangements with Ms. Symes' continuing cooperation to have Ms. Costello here at the morning break anyway.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, I think so, because certainly -- well, I would like to start her unless this examination goes into tomorrow afternoon and there would be no point, but I don't



Smith, Buehler Wallace, Kusiak cr. ex. (Strathy)

it will.

MS. CRONK: Thank you, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: Until 10:00

tomorrow morning; but you naturally won't have to stay, you will not have to be here for any other witnesses that come along, but there is no way we seem to be able to get out. So, until 10:00 tomorrow morning.

---Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m. the hearing adjourned until Thursday, the 26th day of January at 10:00 a.m.



